PSC/PR/2 (CV) Rev.1 Page 14 coupled with the weak human resource, financial and managerial capacity of the Somali institutions and other factors, aggravated the situation. As a result, there was no an immediate and effective follow-up to the recommendations of the NRC. 52. Twelve months after the initial decision authorizing the deployment of AMISOM, less than a quarter of the mandated strength is on the ground. In spite of the numerous appeals made by the AU, echoed by the UN Security Council in several resolutions and presidential statements, the financial and logistical support mobilized so far, which comes mainly from the AU partners, is far short of what is required to fully deploy the Mission, provide it with the required equipment and sustain its operations on the ground. In addition, to date, the pledges made by Member States to contribute troops for AMISOM represent only a little over half of the authorized strength. This state of affairs, not only deprives AMISOM of the much needed reinforcement and of critical components, notably the maritime one, but also make it more difficult for the Commission to engage the international community effectively for it to be more forthcoming in its support and live up to its responsibilities towards Somalia and its people. 53. Another contributing factor to the limited results achieved so far is the lack of cohesion and unity of purpose within the region. As experience has time and again demonstrated, regional cohesion is a key ingredient in any attempt to bring about lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia. Unless the TFG, which is the result of a regionally and internationally sponsored process, operates in a more conducive regional environment it would face huge challenges in fulfilling its responsibilities. 54. Finally, the support received from the larger international community remains inadequate. Much more is needed to build and enhance the capacity of the TFIs for them to effectively play the role expected of them; similar efforts are required to facilitate the full deployment of AMISOM and the implementation of its mandate; urgent action is needed to ensure the deployment of a United Nations operation that would take over from AMISOM and support the long-term reconstruction and stabilization of Somalia. 55. When, towards the end of 2006, the TFG returned to Mogadishu and regained control of large parts of the country, the international community as a whole agreed that this represented an unprecedented opportunity to restore structures of governance in the country, as well as to bring to a definite end the violence that Somalia witnessed for more than a decade and the untold suffering inflicted on its people. However, as stressed by Council in its press statement of 20 December 2007, it is today clear that both the Somali actors and the international community as a whole, have failed to take advantage of this window of opportunity and to mobilize the political will required to bring about lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia. 56. While valuable time has been lost, turning around the situation and achieving lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia remains within reach. However, this would require determined action by both the Somalis and the international community. In this respect, the following needs to be highlighted: