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**REPORT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
ON ITS ACTIVITIES AND THE STATE OF PEACE
AND SECURITY IN AFRICA**

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. According to Article 7(q) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), the PSC shall “submit, through its Chairperson, regular reports to the Assembly on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa.” The present report, prepared in conformity with the said article, covers the activities undertaken by the Council during the period July 2007 to January 2008, and provides an overview of the state of peace and security on the continent during the period.

II. SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF THE PSC PROTOCOL

2. At the time of finalizing this report, 51 member States had signed the Protocol, while 43 had both signed and ratified it. Côte d'Ivoire signed on 27 February 2004 and subsequently ratified the Protocol on 24 August 2007. It deposited its instrument of ratification on 3 October 2007. Two member States are yet to sign and ratify the Protocol, namely, Cape Verde and Eritrea. The following member States have signed the Protocol but have not yet ratified it: Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Seychelles and Somalia.

III. MEMBERSHIP OF THE PSC

3. As stipulated in Article 5 (1) of the Protocol, the PSC is composed of fifteen (15) members with equal rights and which are elected as follows: 10 members elected for a two (2) year term; and five (5) members elected for a three (3) year term. The Assembly would recall that the current members of the PSC for a three year-term, namely, Angola, Algeria, Ethiopia, Gabon and Nigeria, were elected by the Executive Council, in Addis Ababa, in January 2007. The mandate of the newly elected PSC members began on 18 March 2007. The current alphabetical list of the Council members is as follows: Angola, Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Uganda.

4. The mandate of those PSC members elected for a two-year (2) term, namely, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal and Uganda expires in March 2008. Therefore, at the time of finalizing this Report, the Commission had made preparations for the scheduled election of the ten (10) members of the PSC with a mandate of two (2) years during the 10th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council.

IV. ROTATION OF THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE PSC

5. In conformity with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure of the PSC, the chairmanship of the PSC rotates among its members on a monthly basis and following the alphabetical order in English of the list of the PSC members. During the period under review, the chairmanship of the PSC rotated as follows:

- | | | |
|---|--------------|-----------------|
| - | Senegal | July 2007; |
| - | Uganda | August 2007; |
| - | Algeria | September 2007; |
| - | Angola | October 2007; |
| - | Botswana | November 2007; |
| - | Burkina Faso | December 2007; |
| - | Cameroon | January 2008. |

6. It should be noted that, as agreed at the Retreat of the PSC held in Dakar, Senegal, in July 2007, to discuss the working methods of the Council, a new list of PSC members is to be elaborated following each election of PSC members. The line up of the rotating chairpersons of the PSC is to be drawn on the basis of that new list.

V. ACTIVITIES OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

7. During the period under review, the PSC held 30 meetings, which took place at ambassadorial level at the Headquarters of the Union, to consider various conflict situations and related issues. Among the meetings were briefing sessions to receive updates on various situations and issues, at the end of which no decisions were taken. As is the established practice of the PSC, in conformity with the provisions of the PSC Protocol, the countries and other stakeholders concerned with a given issue were invited to some of these meetings and briefing sessions.

a) Meetings on conflict situations and related issues

8. Between July 2007 and January 2008, the PSC considered the conflict situations in the following countries: The Sudan (Darfur, Southern Sudan), Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, The Comoros, Somalia and Kenya. The list of meetings held by the PSC during the period and the issues discussed, as well as the outcomes of those meetings, are reflected on Annex A attached to this Report.

9. Furthermore, at its 98th meeting held on 23 November 2007, in which the United Nations participated, the PSC made a contribution to the report of the United Nations Secretary-General, on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations within the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. The report is to be submitted in pursuance of the Presidential Statement of the United Nations Security Council of 28 March 2007, on the relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organisations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security.

b) Briefing sessions

10. Between July 2007 and January 2008, the PSC held 18 briefing sessions as reflected in Annex A attached to this Report, with a view to receiving updates on issues falling under its mandate. As is the established practice, no decisions were taken by the PSC during the briefing sessions. However, press statements were issued as a record of the discussions and outcomes, as also reflected in Annex A.

c) Other activities of the PSC

i) Retreat of the PSC on Working Methods

11. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) held a Retreat in Dakar, Senegal, on 5 and 6 July 2007, to deliberate on its working methods. The Retreat was conceived around the experience acquired since 2004 and the outcomes of earlier brainstorming retreats, particularly the one held in Cape Town, South Africa, in May 2004, to discuss the AU peace and security architecture. The objective of the Dakar Retreat was to reflect on and put in place working methods of the PSC with a view to rationalizing and smoothening the Council's modus operandi vis-à-vis its continental mandate in the domain of peace, security and stability. At its 85th meeting held on 8 August 2007, the PSC adopted the working methods of the PSC as contained in the Conclusions of the Dakar Brainstorming Retreat (PSC/PR/2(LXXXV) and also agreed to review the working methods regularly and to adjust them as the need arises.

ii) Familiarization Visit of the Peace and Security Council to the Commission

12. On 26 October 2007, and as had been provided for in the programme of work of the PSC for the month of October 2007, under the chairmanship of the Republic of Angola, the Chairperson of the PSC and five (5) other members of the PSC undertook a familiarization visit to the Peace and Security Department and Conference Services Department of the AU Commission. The purpose of the visit was for the PSC to acquaint itself with the work of these two Departments both of which directly support the functioning of the PSC, and the challenges facing them.

iii) Inauguration of the Panel of the Wise

13. Article 11 of the Protocol provides for the establishment of the Panel of the Wise as one of the structures to support the PSC. The Assembly would recall that, by its decision ASS/AU/Dec. 152(VIII) adopted at its 8th Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa in January 2007, it decided, as proposed by the Chairperson of the Commission, to appoint, for a period of three (3) years, members of the Panel of the Wise.

14. As provided for in the PSC Protocol, the PSC, at its 100th meeting held on 12 November 2007, building on the outcome of its 73rd meeting that considered the preliminary draft Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise on 16 March 2007, adopted the Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise. This paved the way for the inauguration of the Panel, in the presence of members of the PSC and other member States, as well as representatives from the international community, on 18 December 2007, in Addis Ababa. The Panel is due to convene its first meeting in Addis Ababa on 18 February 2008.

iv) Participation of the Chairpersons of the PSC in AU-convened meetings/workshops on peace and security

15. On 2 and 3 November 2007, Botswana, in its capacity as Chairperson of the PSC for the month of November 2007, participated at the workshop on the lessons learnt regarding the implementation of the APF for the period 2004-2007, held in

Djibouti, on 2 and 3 November 2007. The representative of Botswana co-chaired a working group on capacity building relating to peace support operations and acted as rapporteur to the plenary meeting. It should be recalled that the Africa Peace Facility (APF) was established by the European Union (EU), at the request of the AU Assembly, with a total financial envelope of € 300 million drawn from the 9th European Development Fund (EDF), to fund peace support operations conducted under the authority of the AU. Several AU-led peace support operations have been supported thus far by resources from the APF.

16. Furthermore, Cameroon, in its capacity as the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of January 2008, participated in the Brainstorming Retreat between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. The Retreat took place in Algiers, Algeria, on 5 and 6 January 2008. The objective of the Retreat was to consider the state of cooperation and agree on ways and means of strengthening and deepening the partnership between the two sides in order to promote peace, security and stability in our Continent, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol.

17. The Retreat considered the draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in the area of Peace and Security between the AU, the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms, elaborated by the Commission within the context of Article 16 of the PSC Protocol. The MoU will be signed during the January 2008 AU Summit in Addis Ababa. More generally, the Retreat afforded an opportunity to take stock of the progress made in the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture. It reviewed the state of peace and security on the Continent, as well as the electoral tensions and disputes that frequently characterize electoral processes in Africa. The Retreat also discussed the funding of peace support efforts in Africa, stressing the need for Member States to contribute more significantly to the funding of the activities undertaken at regional and continental levels. The Retreat adopted a Declaration and requested that this document be brought the attention of the Assembly, for information and action as appropriate. The Declaration is, therefore, herewith attached.

v) Briefings by Chairpersons of the PSC to the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC)

18. Within the spirit of the Conclusions of the Dakar PSC Retreat on Working Methods, the PSC introduced a practice whereby the Chairperson of the PSC for each month briefs the PRC, at the end of the month, on the activities undertaken by the PSC during the month. Notably, the successive Chairpersons of the PSC for the period under review, briefed the PRC on the activities undertaken by the PSC during each month.

VI. STATUS OF PEACE AND SECURITY

19. This part of the Report provides an overview of the conflict and post-conflict situations addressed by the PSC and/or the Commission during the period under review. It should be read in conjunction with the section of the Commission Activity Report on Peace and Security matters which is more detailed.

20. On this score, special mention must be made of the situation in Somalia. At its 104th Meeting held on 20 December 2007, the PSC indicated that the situation in Somalia constituted one of the most serious challenges to Peace and Security facing the Continent. The PSC therefore decided to meet before the expiry of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to re-examine the situation and agree on how best to prepare the January Summit. That PSC Meeting took place on 18 January 2008. On that occasion, it was agreed to join the Report submitted by the Chairperson of the Commission and the Communiqué adopted by the PSC for submission to the Assembly, the objective being to ensure that the Assembly infuses fresh impetus into the peace efforts in Somalia.

a) The Comoros

21. During the period under review, no progress was achieved in resolving the crisis arising from the refusal by the illegal authorities of Anjouan to organize fresh presidential elections in the Island under the required conditions of security and transparency, and more generally, to comply with the fundamental instruments governing the running of the Union.

22. The Ministerial Committee of the countries of the region met in Pretoria from 8 to 9 July 2007 under the chair of South Africa which coordinates the regional efforts to examine the situation. On that occasion, the Committee adopted a number of recommendations making provision for a two-phase approach: firstly, free, fair and transparent elections will be held in Anjouan; then the necessary steps will be taken to find lasting solutions to the inadequacies of current institutional arrangements. While the Union Government accepted these crisis exit proposals, the authorities of the Anjouan Island rejected them. At its 87th Meeting held in Addis Ababa on 13 August 2007, the PSC requested the Commission to work in close collaboration with countries of the region to come up with concrete proposals, considering every option, including individual and targeted sanctions to be imposed on the de facto authorities of Anjouan.

23. Subsequently, a meeting of high-ranking officials from countries of the region and the troop-contributing countries of the AU Electoral Assistance and Security Mission to the Comoros (MAES) was held in Addis Ababa on 4 September 2007. The meeting came up with recommendations which were considered by the Ministerial Committee of countries of the region in Pretoria on 18 September 2007. The Committee submitted proposals on how to end the crisis to the Union Government and the illegal authorities of Anjouan. Whereas the Union Government accepted these proposals, the illegal authorities of Anjouan rejected them.

24. The Ministerial Committee came up with recommendations for the PSC, providing not only for organization of fresh elections in Anjouan to pave the way for the search for solutions to the problem of power sharing between the Union and the autonomous Islands and that of governance, but also for individual and other sanctions to be imposed on all persons obstructing the reconciliation process in the Comoros. At its 95th Meeting held on 10 October 2007 in Addis Ababa, the PSC endorsed the recommendations of the Ministerial Committee. Generally, the Government of the Union of the Comoros and the Comorian people welcomed the PSC decision aimed at compelling the illegal authorities of Anjouan to accept the crisis settlement framework as defined by the African Union. For their part, the illegal

authorities of Anjouan reacted defiantly and continued to demand the holding of an inter-Comorian Round Table as a pre-condition for possible organization of a fresh presidential election in the island.

25. The PSC has since twice extended the sanctions imposed on the illegal authorities of Anjouan, first, for an additional period of 60 days at its meeting of 26 November 2007; and then for a further period of 30 days, at its meeting of 21 January 2008, as well as the mandate of MAES. Furthermore, the PSC requested countries of the region to meet and submit any recommendations deemed appropriate on the way forward. As of the time of finalization of this Report, arrangements were already being made for the meeting to be on the fringe of the current Session of the Executive Council.

a) Somalia

26. The period under review witnessed the convening of the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC), in Mogadishu, from 15 July to 30 August 2007. Over 2,600 participants took part in the Congress. However, some of the actors who could have contributed significantly to the NRC decided to stay away. The Congress concluded its deliberations with the parties agreeing on a number of issues, including the announcement of an end to the civil war and conflicts that have torn Somalia apart since 1978; the call on all Somali parties to voluntarily disarm and return looted property; the request to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) to implement all the constitutional processes provided for by the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) that would lead to the achievement of federalism in the country; the conduct of a population census; and the holding of free and fair elections that will usher in a democratically elected government before the end of 2009.

27. The various opposition groups met in Asmara from 6 to 13 September 2007, where they held a parallel Congress. The meeting agreed on the formation of an Alliance for the Liberation and Reconstitution of Somalia, with the stated aim of liberating Somalia from “Ethiopian occupation” and launching a political process that would involve all Somali stakeholders and rebuild the Somali State.

28. The period under consideration also witnessed heightened tension within the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), with a deepening rift between President Yusuf and Prime Minister Ali Gedi over issues of transparency and accountability, as well as diverging interpretations of the TFC. This tension was eventually overcome with the resignation of Prime Minister Gedi on 29 October 2007. He has since been replaced by Nur Hassan Houssien, a former Head of the ICRC in Somalia. Subsequently, the Prime Minister has formed a new cabinet, which was overwhelmingly endorsed by the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). Since his appointment, the new Prime Minister has repeatedly stressed that reconciliation would be at the core of his activities during his tenure in office. On 23 January 2008, an AU Commission delegation led by the Commissioner for Peace and Security travelled to Mogadishu for consultations with the Prime Minister. The discussions provided an opportunity to review the situation and agree on the concrete steps that need to be taken to further peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

29. While the TFG and Ethiopian forces have continued to make sustained efforts to improve security in Mogadishu, the situation in the capital remains precarious.

Most of the incidents reported during the period under consideration involved the use of grenade attacks, roadside bombs, mortar attacks and small arms fire against the TFG and Ethiopian forces, as well as clashes between the security forces and the insurgents. Inter-clan incidents were also reported in other regions of Somalia. It should also be noted that Somalia is one of the highest-risk areas for piracy in the world. This situation, amongst others, threatens the delivery of humanitarian assistance, especially since approximately 80% of the assistance to Somalia by the World Food Programme is shipped by sea. Against this background, it is worth noting the steps taken by France to protect WFP humanitarian supplies to Somalia. The prevailing security situation in Mogadishu, in particular, and Somalia, in general, has led to the worsening of the humanitarian situation in the country, including an increase in the number of the internally displaced persons.

30. During the period under review, no significant progress was made in strengthening AMISOM, owing to the continued financial and logistical constraints facing the Commission. To date, out of the 8,000 troops authorized by the PSC in January 2007, only 3 battalions (2 from Uganda and 1 from Burundi) are on the ground, in Mogadishu. Steps are underway to deploy the second battalion pledged by Burundi. No timetable has yet been set for the deployment of the remaining Burundian battalion and the contingents pledged by Ghana and Nigeria. Also, no new contributions of troops were recorded.

31. On 18 July 2007, the PSC extended the mandate of AMISOM for a further period of 6 months, expiring in mid-January 2008. . At its 105th meeting held on 18 January 2008, the PSC again extended AMISOM's mandate for a further period of 6 months. In both decisions, the PSC reiterated its urgent call to the AU member States and partners to provide the necessary support to make it possible for AMISOM to rapidly attain its authorized strength and to continue its operations. It also called on all member States to contribute troops and other personnel required for AMISOM. The PSC stressed, once again, the need for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia that will take over from AMISOM and support the long-term stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia. Pending such a deployment, the PSC called on the United Nations to put in place a financial, logistical and technical support package for AMISOM, within the context of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

32. In this respect, it should be noted that in his report of 7 November 2007 on the situation in Somalia, the UN Secretary-General reiterated his belief that, under the prevailing political and security situation, the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation cannot be considered a realistic and viable option. He proposed to look at additional security options, including the deployment of a robust multinational force or coalition of the willing. On its part, the Security Council, both in its resolution 1772 (2007) and presidential statement of 19 December 2007, urged the international community to provide support to AMISOM, and requested the Secretary-General to consult with AU on what further support might be provided to the Mission and to continue to develop the existing contingency plan for the possible deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation to succeed AMISOM. In this context, the UN team recently visited Addis Ababa for consultation with the Commission on the peace keeping efforts in Somalia.

c) Peace Process between Eritrea and Ethiopia

33. During the period under review, no progress has been made in the peace process between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The situation in the TSZ established pursuant to the Algiers Agreement of June 2000 remains tense. According to UNMEE, Eritrea continues to maintain military presence and heavy military equipment, including tanks, in the TSZ, and has deployed additional military personnel and equipment into the zone during the period under consideration, while the troops and heavy equipment deployed in October 2006 by Ethiopia in areas adjacent to the TSZ have remained in position. Furthermore, UNMEE's ability to monitor the TSZ continues to be hampered by the numerous restrictions imposed on its operations by Eritrea.

34. On 30 July 2007, the Security Council adopted resolution 1767(2007) through which it, *inter alia*, extended the mandate of UNMEE for a period of six months, until 31 January 2008, reiterated its demands that Eritrea immediately withdraw its troops and heavy military equipment from the TSZ, and called on Ethiopia to reduce the number of additional military forces recently introduced in certain areas adjacent to the TSZ. The Security Council demanded that the parties provide UNMEE with the necessary access, assistance, support and protection required for the performance of its duties, and reiterated its demand that Eritrea reverse, without further delay or preconditions, all restrictions on UNMEE's movement and operations.

35. On 6 and 7 September 2007, at The Hague, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) met with the parties. However, no progress was made in overcoming the difficulties impeding the implementation of the April 2002 Delimitation Decision. Against this background, the EEBC reminded the parties of its statement of 27 November 2006, in which it gave them one year to settle their differences, after which, if no agreement is reached on how to proceed with the demarcation, "the boundary will automatically stand as demarcated by the boundary points listed in the Annex hereto and the mandate of the Commission could then be regarded as fulfilled." Accordingly, the EEBC officially terminated its activities at the end of November 2007.

36. On 22 September 2007, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister wrote to his Eritrean counterpart, stressing that Eritrea, by introducing troops and heavy equipment in the TSZ, had committed a material breach of the Algiers Agreements. The Minister further stated that this situation could compel his country to consider resorting to legal and peaceful options under international law, including terminating the Algiers Agreements or suspending its participation in these instruments. The Minister also reiterated his country's opposition to the decision of the EEBC to demarcate the border through map coordinates as contained in its statement of November 2006. On his part, the Eritrean Foreign Minister wrote to the Witnesses of the Algiers Agreements and to the President of the Security Council, accusing Ethiopia of repeated violations of the Algiers Agreements and of refusing to cooperate with the EEBC. He called on the Security Council to enforce the Delimitation Decision.

37. On 27 December 2007, the Eritrean Cabinet of Ministers accepted the "virtual demarcation" of the border as decided by the EEBC. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General dated 15 January 2008, the Eritrean President indicated that, as far as his country was concerned, the border has been demarcated and the chapter closed. Consistent to its position, as stated at the above-mentioned EEBC meeting, Ethiopia

dismissed the “virtual demarcation” of the border as unacceptable and legally baseless, calling for a physical demarcation, through dialogue, and respect of the Algiers Agreement.

38. At the time of finalizing this report, the UN Security Council was yet to decide on the extension of UNMEE mandate, against the backdrop of continued stalemate in the peace process and further constraints on the Mission’s operations, arising from the limitations on fuel supplies imposed by Eritrea.

d) Burundi

39. The political crisis which paralyzed the National Assembly and the Government for months on end died down, thanks to the dialogue initiated in August 2007 by the President of the Republic between the main Opposition parties - FRODEBU and UPRONA - and concluded to the satisfaction of all concerned. Thus, on 14 November 2007, the country set up a Government made up of the three main political parties - CNDD-FDD, FRODEBU and UPRONA - in accordance with the Constitution of Burundi. As part of the efforts that helped diffuse the situation, mention should be made of the two PSC meetings held on 20 July and 10 August 2007 respectively, and also the visit undertaken to Bujumbura by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security in early August 2007.

40. The Palipehutu-FNL issue has so far remained unresolved. In this regard, it should be recalled that last July, the day after the 17 June 2007 meeting between President Pierre Nkurunziza and Agathon Rwasa in Dar-es-Salaam, Palipehutu-FNL delegates in the implementation structures unexpectedly decided to leave Bujumbura on 21 July 2007. The unceasing efforts of the Facilitation and the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), in collaboration with the United Nations, to get the parties to bring the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement implementation process to completion, have since remained unsuccessful.

41. In fact, the process became even more complicated. Armed men claiming to have dissociated themselves from Mr. Rwasa, leader of Palipehutu-FNL progressively moved into various locations around the capital. Called in by the Government to help, the Facilitator, after consultation with the Regional Initiative, was instructed to handle this particular issue from a purely humanitarian angle. These dissidents were thus assembled in two camps where they are being taken care of.

42. It should be recalled that, at its Meeting of 20 July, the PSC urged the parties to honor their obligations and commitments and to speed up the Comprehensive Ceasefire Implementation Process which was expected to be concluded not later than December 2007. In view of the difficulties encountered and the attendant delays, the Facilitator plans to give an account of his mandate and to seek fresh directives on the way forward.

e) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

43. During the period under consideration, the political situation in the DRC continued to stabilize. The overall cordial relations between the Government and the Parliament paved the way for adoption of crucial laws, including those relating to decentralization, the status of the opposition, funding of the political parties and other

reforms concerning the justice sector. Parliament also declared itself in favor of the ratification of the Security, Stability and Development Pact of the Great Lakes Region signed on 15 December 2006, as part of the process of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

44. This positive development was followed by marked improvement in the regional climate. Thus, at the invitation of his Congolese counterpart, the Rwandan Foreign Minister undertook a working visit to Kinshasa, from 2 to 4 September 2007. The two delegations discussed the security situation in the East of the DRC, and agreed on the need to set up a consultation, monitoring and evaluation mechanism for management of their mutual commitments. Additionally, following the incidents that occurred on Lake Albert, through which runs the border between the DRC and Uganda, Presidents Joseph Kabila and Yoweri Museveni met in Tanzania at the invitation of President Jakaya Kikwete. In a joint Communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, the two Heads of State reaffirmed their commitment to the ideals and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the Constitutive Act of the African Union and in the Security, Stability and Development Pact for the Great Lakes Region. It is encouraging to note that the two countries took a decision to fully restore their diplomatic relations.

45. While the political situation and relations with the neighboring countries gradually improved, the security and humanitarian situation in the Kivus, in general, and in North Kivu, in particular, continued to be a source of major concern. On this score, the threat that the ex-FAR/Interahamwé have continued to pose to peace and security in the DRC and in the region at large should not be ignored. The *Congrès national pour la défense du peuple* (CNDP), a political *cum* military movement created by the dissident General Laurent Nkunda, constituted further source of serious concern. Furthermore, the humanitarian situation engendered by the current fighting and violence in North Kivu have become quite worrying.

46. At its 97th Meeting held on 25 October 2007, the PSC strongly condemned the acts perpetrated by General Laurent Nkunda and his men, and urged them to rejoin, without delay, the integration centers with a view to their integration into the Congolese army. It also, just as firmly, condemned the acts of destabilization in the region, and the violence unleashed against the people by the ex-FAR/Interahamwé, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the other armed groups operating in the East of the DRC.

47. In this connection, it is important to mention the Tripartite + meeting, under the facilitation of the Government of the United States of America, held in Kampala from 15 to 17 September 2007. The meeting took important decisions reflected in a document entitled "Strategies to put an end to the threats to regional security by negative forces". This ministerial meeting was followed by that of the leadership of the armed forces and intelligence services of the concerned countries, held in Lubumbashi, on 1 and 2 October 2007. In addition, in the margin of the meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Committee of the process of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, held in Nairobi from 7 to 9 November 2007, the Foreign Ministers of the DRC and Rwanda, under the auspices of the United Nations, signed an agreement in which their two countries agreed on "a common approach to the threat posed by the ex-FAR/Interahamwé to security and stability in their two

countries". In pursuance of this Agreement, a Tripartite + Summit was held in Addis Ababa, on 5 December 2007, under the aegis of the United States of America.

48. Concurrently with the above initiatives, the Government of the DRC organized in Goma, from 6 to 23 January 2008, a Conference on Peace, Security and Development in the Kivus, attended by the armed groups in the region, elected local and national figures from these two provinces, Civil Society representatives and International Community representatives, including the African Union. This Conference culminated in the conclusion of a Peace Agreement. At its 106th Meeting held on 19 January 2008, the PSC welcomed the convening of this Conference by the Congolese Government and expressed the hope that the conclusions thereof would help speed up the restoration of peace and stability in the region.

49. At its meeting of 25 October 2007, the PSC invited the Commission to send a fact-finding mission to the DRC on the security problems along the borders with the CAR and The Sudan resulting among other things from population exodus and to come up with pertinent recommendations. This request was in consequence of the information provided by the DRC Government representative at the PSC meeting, regarding the presence, in the Eastern Province, of Bororo preachers that came in from the countries of the region and the resultant security problems. Pursuant to this decision, an AU delegation proceeded to the DRC and the CAR. The delegation was also mandated to visit The Sudan, Cameroon and Chad and then submit its report.

f) The Sudan

i) Southern Sudan

50. Efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) have continued during the period under review. However, the relationship between the partners to the CPA, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), witnessed further strains, arising from the difficulties encountered in the implementation process of the CPA. Thus, on 11 October 2007, the SPLM suspended the participation of its ministers and presidential advisors from the Government of National Unity (GoNU). The SPLM explained its decision by what it described as deliberate tactics by the NCP to obstruct the implementation of the CPA. The SPLM called on the international community to assist in resolving the impasse.

51. On its part, the NCP, while rejecting the call to involve third parties, as joint mechanisms are provided for addressing outstanding issues, urged the SPLM to lift the suspension of its participation in the GoNU. While visiting South Africa, President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir stressed that "there will be no return to war whatsoever," and reiterated his Party's commitment "to the full implementation of the Agreement in letter and spirit", as well as his resolve to work together with the SPLM in genuine partnership to resolve the outstanding issues and to achieve the unity of the Sudan. On 23 October 2007, the NCP presented to the international community in Khartoum a document stating that the SPLM and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) had also acted in violation of the CPA and delayed its implementation.

52. Clearly, while significant progress has been made in the implementation of the CPA, since 2005, through, *inter alia*, the adoption of the Interim National Constitution

and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan and the establishment of the institutions provided for in the Agreement, as well as the general compliance with the ceasefire, a number of challenges are yet to be overcome by the parties. It is against this background that the PSC, at its 89th meeting held on 24 August 2007, urged the parties, with the support of AU member States, to intensify their efforts to address the outstanding issues in the implementation of the CPA, including the Abyei Protocol, the full redeployment of forces, the complete formation and deployment of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), the demarcation of the North-South border and wealth sharing, and ensure that all the necessary steps are taken in preparation for the forthcoming elections as stipulated in the CPA.

53. In view of the tension between the parties to the CPA and the implications thereof, the PSC convened yet another meeting on 27 November 2007 to review the situation. On that occasion, the PSC expressed its deep concern with regards to the difficulties encountered in the implementation process of the CPA and the suspension by the SPLM of its participation in the GoNU. The PSC stressed that failure to address the outstanding issues in the implementation process of the CPA could jeopardize the significant progress achieved thus far, with serious consequences for peace and stability in the Sudan and in the entire region.

54. On 11 December 2007, following extensive discussions between the two partners to the CPA, the SPLM announced that its ministers would soon be rejoining the GoNU. The parties further agreed on other confidence building measures aimed at strengthening the relations between the North and the South. Two weeks later, the SPLM designated ministers were sworn in as members of GoNU, thus ending two months of deadlock that threatened to derail the implementation process of the CPA.

55. In its communiqué of 24 August 2007, the PSC requested the Commission to take all the necessary steps to fully support the implementation of the CPA, including through the appointment of a new Special Envoy and the establishment of an appropriately staffed AU Liaison Office in Khartoum, with an Office in Juba. At the time of finalizing this report, steps were underway to establish the AU Office and appoint the Special Envoy.

ii) Darfur

56. During the period under review, efforts have continued to be made to reactivate the peace process in Darfur. The AU Special Envoy for Darfur, Salim Ahmed Salim, and his UN counterpart, Jan Eliasson, supported by their respective teams, intensified their consultations with the Sudanese parties, as well as with a wide range of Darfuri and other stakeholders, with a view to preparing for the start of the substantive negotiations. Among other issues, these consultations focused on determining the parties' positions on the venue, agenda, format and modalities for their participation, as well as on the organization of workshops to enhance their understanding of the issues to be discussed.

57. The Special Envoys also invited the leaders of the Movements to meetings in Arusha in Tanzania, and N'djamena in Chad, in August and September 2007, respectively, in an effort to provide a convenient forum for consultations among themselves. On its part and in order to assist the Movements to unify their ranks and to form a common negotiating position, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement

(SPLM) took the initiative to bring to Juba many of the non-signatories during the months of October and November 2007. The Juba process was concluded on 29 November 2007. As a result of this process, the Movements united the 17 groups and other individuals into two broad coalitions. However, the two groups requested more time to go back to the field and consult with their respective constituencies in order to strengthen the gains made in Juba and possibly come out with a unified negotiating team and position.

58. The Darfur Peace Talks opened in Sirte, Libya, on 27 October 2007. The inaugural ceremony was presided by the Libyan Leader and attended by various members of the international community. Unfortunately, some of the leaders of the Movements, including Abdulwahid El Nour, from the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), and Khalil Ibrahim, of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), refused to attend the Sirte Talks.

59. Subsequently, and as part of the efforts to promote the Sirte process, the two Special Envoys convened a meeting with the regional partners, in Asmara, Eritrea, on 14 November 2007. They held another meeting with the regional partners in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, on 4 December 2007. The participants agreed that the Juba unification process had ended on a positive note. They also agreed on the need to give more time to the Movements to enable them finalize their re-organization. Finally, they agreed on the desirability of having another Arusha type meeting, which would bring together the leaders/ representatives of the various movements.

60. Furthermore, the two Special Envoys undertook a visit to the Sudan from 13 to 19 January 2008, to assess the progress made regarding the unification of the ranks of the Movements, to solicit the views of the Sudanese parties on the need for holding an Arusha-type meeting and their readiness to commence the substantive negotiations. Currently, there are five major groups: the two established in Juba – United Resistance Front (URF) and the SLM/A/Abdul Shafie -, the SLM/A-Unity (Abdallah Yahiya), the SLM/A (Abdulwahid) and the JEM (Khalil Ibrahim). While the Government, the URF and the SLM/A-Unity expressed their readiness for any of these two encounters, the SLM/A-Abul Shafie stated that it would need more time to consolidate the gains made in Juba and that it would not be ready before the end of March. Mr. Abdulwahid El Nour and Dr. Khalil Ibrahim continue to put forward pre-conditions for their participation in any meeting. The Special Envoys decided to intensify their consultations with the parties in order to move the process forward.

61. With regard to peace keeping aspects, it should be recalled that, at its meeting held on 22 June 2007, the PSC endorsed the deployment, as soon as possible, of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation (UNAMID). This was followed by the adoption by the Security Council, on 31 July 2007, of resolution 1769 (2007) authorizing the establishment of UNAMID for an initial period of 12 months. The force generation process is in progress at the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) in New York, in cooperation with the AU. Contributions are still outstanding, especially in areas of aviation and heavy ground transportation units. Between October and December 2007, a joint AU-UN high ranking operational and advisory team visited potential Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to provide necessary advice and assistance to TCCs. From 19 to 21 November 2007, a combined AU-UN special task force was dispatched to Ethiopia and Egypt to determine the possibility of the deployment, on a fast track basis, of two infantry

battalions from these two countries as part of the early effect package. Both countries confirmed their readiness to deploy during the 1st quarter of 2008. Regarding the initial Headquarters operating capability, the Joint Special Representative, Rodolphe Adada, his Deputy, the UNAMID Force Commander and Deputy Force Commanders and other key personnel, as well as the Sector Commanders from Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal have been deployed. The Deputy Sector Commanders from Egypt, Pakistan and China have also been deployed to the Mission area. The formal transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID took place on 31 December 2007.

62. The Joint Special Representative is working closely with the Sudanese authorities to create the required conditions in order to expedite the deployment of UNAMID. Consultations are also underway, in a spirit of cooperation and transparency, between the AU, the UN and the Sudanese government to address all outstanding issues, with a view to ensuring the full deployment of UNAMID and facilitating the conduct of its operation on the ground.

63. The Chair of Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) is continuing with his consultations with a range of stakeholders and prominent individuals in Darfur. Issues relating to compensation, rehabilitation and return featured prominently during these consultations.

64. The security situation continues to be of utmost concern. A number of attacks involving various parties have been recorded during the period under review, targeting civilians, humanitarian workers and the Sudanese Armed Forces alike. Also worth noting is the prevailing security situation on the Chadian side of the Chad/Sudan border, which adversely affects the situation in Darfur.

65. Throughout its presence in Darfur, AMIS has operated under a very challenging security environment. On 29 September 2007, an attack was perpetrated by unidentified armed elements on the Mission's military group site in Haskanita, resulting in the death of 12 AMIS personnel, while 10 others were seriously wounded and one is still unaccounted for. The PSC, meeting on 2 October 2007, condemned this attack, and requested the Commission to undertake, jointly with the United Nations, a thorough investigation of the incident, with a view to identifying the culprits. Since then, a joint AU/UN investigation has been underway.

g) Situation in Chad and Chad-Sudan Relation

66. During the reporting period, the Chadian authorities continued to dialogue with the opposition movements. On this score, President Idriss Déby received on 30 July 2007, in N'djamena, thanks to the mediation of President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, a group of about thirty Chadian exiles led by former President Goukouni Weddei. Just as encouraging was the signing, on 13 August 2007, of an "Agreement for the Strengthening of the Democratic Process in Chad" between the presidential party and the democratic opposition parties – an event resulting from the negotiations that took place from 14 April to 10 August 2007.

67. On 6 September 2007, one of the armed movements, the Chadian Democratic and Revolutionary Council signed a peace agreement with the Government under the auspices of Libya. A month later, on 8 October in Cotonou, the Government and some exiled political parties embarked upon negotiations leading to an agreement

which paved the way for them to return to their country. Lastly, negotiations entered into in July between the Government and four leaders of political-military movements led to an Agreement solemnly signed in Sirte, Libya, on 25 October 2007.

68. However, the situation suddenly took a turn for the worse in Eastern Chad, when, in the night of 24-25 November 2007, an armed group attacked a national police company at a locality less than 100 kms from the city of Abéché. On 26 November 2007, heavy fighting erupted 90 kms to the East of Abéché, between the rebel forces and the Chadian National Army. It was against this background that, on 1 December 2007, the Minister of Defense, Mahamat Adbelkérim Nour, was dismissed from the Government. Formerly the leader of the United Front for Change (FUC), Mahamat Nour had signed, in Tripoli, on 24 December 2006, an Agreement with the Government by which he joined the Cabinet on 4 March 2007. However, the reluctance of his troops to be disarmed and the skirmishes that followed in November 2007 in Guéréda, pointed a finger of suspicion as to whether his movement was really intent on honoring the Agreement signed in Tripoli.

69. Clashes in the East of Chad revived the polemic between Chad and The Sudan. Chad held The Sudan responsible. The two countries continued to trade accusations of violation of their territorial integrity and acts of destabilization. The Commission, for its part, urged the two Governments to show restraint and to do their utmost to diffuse the ongoing tension and contribute to re-establishment of normalcy along their common border.

h) Central African Republic (CAR)

70. As part of efforts at consolidating the return of peace in the CAR, the CAR Government has, since the beginning of 2007, been engaged in talks with the political/military groups. These efforts have continued to be directed to People's Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (APRD), a rebel movement that has remained active in the North-West and in the North of the country. Mention should also be made of the problems encountered in the implementation of the Peace Agreements signed in Sirte, Libya; and in Birao, CAR, in February and April 2007, with the Central African People's Democratic Front (FDPC) and the Union of Democratic Forces (UFDR), respectively. Lastly, the CAR continued to be faced with the blight of organized crime perpetrated by highway bandits.

71. The CAR defense and security forces, still being restructured were yet to attain the level of operational capacity required to deal with the security situation prevailing in the country; and hence the need to maintain the presence of the CEMAC Multinational Force (FOMUC). The Commission also supported the successive requests of CEMAC for the EU to continue to fund FOMUC under the Peace Facility for Africa (PFA). In addition, the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), at their Summit held in Brazzaville, on 30 October 2007, further highlighted the need to keep the Force, and to this end, instructed the ECCAS Committee of Ambassadors to study the modalities of transferring the supervisory authority from CEMAC to the ECCAS.

72. It was in this context that Central African countries were preparing the inclusive political dialogue, which would have to take on board the politico-military movements. On 30 November 2007, the Head of State François Bozizé promulgated

two decrees establishing the Dialogue Preparatory Committee and appointing its members; and following its formal inauguration on 18 December 2007, the Committee started deliberations. The AU was invited to take part in the dialogue.

73. For its part, and pursuant to PSC Decision of 7 December 2006, the Commission continued to deploy effort in support of reconstruction and consolidation of peace in the country. On this score, the Commission organized, on 19 October 2007, in Addis Ababa, in conjunction with the African Development Bank (ADB) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), an African Solidarity Conference in favour of the CAR, with Member States and ECCAS in attendance. The Commission also participated in the CAR development partners' Round Table held in Brussels on 26 October 2007. The Round Table helped mobilize substantial support for implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper adopted by the Government of the Central African Republic in September 2007.

i) Multidimensional Presence in CAR and Chad

74. On 25 September 2007, the Security Council, by its Resolution 1778 (2007), approved the establishment in Chad and the Central African Republic, of a multidimensional presence intended to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons. The Council decided that the multidimensional presence shall include, for a period of one year, a United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). Meanwhile, the Security Council authorized the European Union to deploy, for a period of one year, an operation (known as EUFOR Chad/CAR) to support the MINURCAT. Moreover, the Security Council encouraged the Government of Chad to establish a "Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire (PTPH) – Chadian Police for Humanitarian Protection". The Resolution was adopted in a context marked by a disturbing security situation in both Eastern Chad and North-Eastern CAR, giving rise to an acute humanitarian crisis.

75. As part of implementation of Resolution 1778 (2007) a number of police and military liaison officers and other civilian personnel of MINURCAT have already been deployed in the field. The Mission is working together with the Chadian Government for the establishment of the PTPH. However, there has been some delay in the constitution of the EUFOR Chad/CAR. In his report on the MINURCAT dated 17 December 2007, the United Nations Secretary General stated that this delay could affect the deployment of the MINURCAT.

j) Liberia

76. The period under review witnessed further progress in the efforts to consolidate peace and reconstruct Liberia, as it emerges from years of conflict and devastation. On 13 November 2007, the World Bank decided to clear Liberia's outstanding arrears, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that it had secured sufficient financial pledges from member countries to allow it to provide debt relief to Liberia. As indicated by the International Contact Group on Liberia, in a statement issued on 16 December 2007, these developments are important steps towards a comprehensive solution to Liberia's unsustainable external debt burden and reflect the international community's continued strong support for the

Government's economic and financial reforms. More generally, 2007 has been a year of remarkable achievements in Liberia in the socio-economic field.

77. The promotion of national reconciliation and inclusiveness in the decision making process has continued to feature prominently in the Government's activities. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, whose mandate is due to expire in September 2008, resumed its activities on the public hearings and statement taking process on 8 January 2008, which involve a wide range of personalities. On her part, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has embarked on a consultative process aimed at seeking the views of Liberian political parties and civil society groups on issues of national concern. Progress has also been made regarding the security situation, which has remained generally calm both within Liberia itself and along the country's borders with its neighbours. Efforts continue to be made in carrying forward the security sector reform.

78. It is against this background of significant progress in the stabilisation of Liberia that, last August, the United Nations Secretary-General made proposals on a phased drawdown of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The Secretary-General indicated that the process would "allow UNMIL to adapt to evolving priorities and to conduct a gradual, phased and deliberate transfer of responsibility for the security of Liberia to the Government in a manner that gives the Government the opportunity to build its capacity, while the Mission continues to maintain the prevailing stability". In its resolution 1777 (2007) of 20 September 2007, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of UNMIL until 30 September 2008, endorsed the recommendations for a reduction in the number of military and police components of the Mission, and expressed its intention to review by that date recommendations for further UNMIL reduction in the context of the security situation in Liberia and the sub-region.

k) Côte d'Ivoire

79. Since the signing of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement and an Additional Agreement on 4 and 26 March 2007, respectively, by President Laurent Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro, Secretary General of the New Forces, under the auspices of President Blaise Compaoré, President of Faso, current President of ECOWAS and Facilitator of the Direct Dialogue, there have been a chain of demonstrations for national reconciliation and reunification of the country. On 30 July 2007, President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Soro incinerated about 2,000 weapons of war at a ceremony christened "Flame of Peace" held in Bouaké. On his way to Bouaké, President Laurent Gbagbo, for the first time since the eruption of the crisis, crossed the ceasefire line which represented the *de facto* partition of the country. From 28 to 30 November 2007, President Gbagbo toured several areas in the North of the country under the control of the New Forces. On that occasion, the President of the Republic reiterated his call for an end to the war. Furthermore, the two former opposing forces - the Defense and Security Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FDSCI) and the Armed Forces of the New Forces (FAFN), marched side by side in Abidjan and in other cities of the country on the occasion of the commemoration of the independence anniversary of Côte d'Ivoire.

80. For its part, the International Community continued to support implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement. On this score, the United Nations Security

Council, on 16 July 2007, adopted resolution 1765 (2007) endorsing the recommendations of the United Nations Secretary General on the need to align the role of UNOCI with the new phase of the peace process, as defined by the Ouagadougou Political Agreement. That resolution put an end to the mandate of the High Representative for Elections and decided, as a result, that the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General in Côte d'Ivoire would certify that all the stages of the electoral process would provide all the guarantees required for the holding of open, free, fair and transparent presidential and parliamentary elections in accordance with international standards. Moreover, the Security Council declared that it welcomed the creation of an International Consultative Organ (ICO) as agreed by the signatory parties and the Facilitator, to accompany the Ivorian political forces and the Facilitator in the implementation of Agreement. The African Union is a member of this body. Again, at the Donors' Round Table organized by the Ivorian Government on 18 July 2007, the pledges amounting to over 180 billion CFA Francs were made towards funding the crisis exit process.

81. However, delays occurred in the calendar for implementing the Ouagadougou Political Agreement; first, as a result of the disturbances occasioned by the end of June 2007 attack against the Prime Minister in Bouaké; and then, owing to a number of technical issues which had not been taken into account at the time the Agreement was signed. To speed up implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Soro concluded, in Ouagadougou on 28 November 2007, the Second and Third Additional Agreements to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, both in respect of definitive selection of a technical operator to produce Ivorian identity cards as well as voters' cards, and also work out a new election calendar. This calendar was supposed to conclude with the organization of presidential election not later than the first half of 2008 in accordance with a calendar to be recommended to Government by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).

82. At its 104th Meeting held on 20 December 2007, the PSC noted, with satisfaction, the encouraging developments in Côte d'Ivoire since the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement and the progress achieved in its implementation. It also called upon the parties to redouble their efforts to fast track the implementation process. On this score, Council welcomed the conclusion of the Second and Third Additional Agreements which it endorsed. In light of the PSC Decision, the United Nations Security Council, by resolution 1795 (2008) of 15 January 2008, also approved the Additional Agreements and called on the parties to fully honour their commitments, in good faith, in accordance with the new calendar established to this effect. Meanwhile, the third meeting of the Direct Dialogue Evaluation and Accompaniment Committee held in Ouagadougou on 14 January 2008 underscored the need to consolidate implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement and appealed to the parties to strengthen measures aimed at ensuring safety and security of the peace process.

I) Western Sahara

83. The main highlight of the period under review was the launching of direct negotiations between the parties to the dispute on Western Sahara, namely, Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, as mandated by UN Security Council resolution 1754 (2007) of April 2007. The two parties met twice in Manhasset, New York: first, on 18 and 19 June, and then on 10 and 11 August 2007. The talks did not result in any

movement forward, as the parties positions remained far apart: while Morocco insisted on its proposal of autonomy for the Territory, within the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom, the Frente POLISARIO argued for a free and fair referendum of self-determination, in accordance with the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

84. It is against this background that the United Nations Security Council, on 31 October 2007, adopted resolution 1783 (2007), by which it called upon the two parties “to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to engage in substantive negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolution 1754 (2007) and the success of negotiations”. The Security Council further called upon the parties “to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking account of the efforts made since 2006 and developments of the last months, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, noting the role and responsibility of the parties in this respect”.

85. As a follow-up to this resolution, the parties have yet again met in Manhasset, New York, from 7 to 9 January 2008, for the third round of negotiations. While no breakthrough was registered, the two sides did however agree to meet, at the same venue, between 11 and 13 March 2008, to continue with the dialogue.

m) Post-Electoral Dispute and Violence in Kenya

86. In an unexpected turn of events, Kenya, a country long known for its stability, economic dynamism and progress towards democracy, witnessed a dramatic deterioration of the political and security conditions in the aftermath of the presidential election of 27 December 2007. Indeed, while, by all accounts, the voting had been impressively orderly and peaceful, the announcement of the results by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), which declared the incumbent President, Mwai Kibaki, winner against Raila Odinga of the opposition’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), was followed by massive violence with serious humanitarian and socio-economic impact. The ODM rejected the outcome, accusing the Government of having rigged the results. Since then, and in spite of all the efforts made so far, Kenya has been faced with continued tension.

87. It is against this background that the Chairperson of the Union, President John Kufuor, travelled to Kenya from 8 to 10 January 2008, with a view to assisting in defusing the tension, bringing an end to the violence and facilitating the efforts aimed at finding a solution to the post-election dispute. On that occasion, President Kufuor met with both parties, with whom he agreed that a group of eminent African Elders led by the former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, would be established to undertake the mediation efforts. Since then, Mr. Kofi Annan has arrived in Nairobi and met with the parties. On 22 January 2008, the Commissioner for Peace and Security undertook a visit to Nairobi to express AU’s support for the mediation efforts led by Mr. Kofi Annan, and see how best the Commission could further assist these efforts. During his visit, the Commissioner witnessed the meeting, facilitated by Mr. Kofi Annan, between President Mwai Kibaki and Mr. Raila

Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement, during which both leaders made an appeal for calm and committed themselves to dialogue.

88. On its part, the PSC, at its meeting held on 21 January 2008, expressed deep concern at the prevailing situation and its humanitarian consequences, as well as at its implications for peace and stability in Kenya and the region as a whole. It called on all the parties to exercise restraint, refrain from acts of violence and from any other act that could further complicate the situation, as well as prevail on their supporters to put an immediate end to the violence. The PSC stressed the need for the parties to extend full cooperation to the mediation efforts to be undertaken by the group of eminent African elders.

VII. CONCLUSION

89. The PSC showed dynamism during the period under consideration, as attested by the number of meetings held and the diversity of issues addressed. In addition, the PSC endeavoured to improve its working methods, on the basis of the conclusions of the Retreat held in Dakar in early July. Efforts deployed to strengthen the partnership between the PSC on the one hand, and the United Nations and other international organizations referred to in Article 17 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC on the other hand, should also be mentioned. These efforts will be pursued and extended to other bodies mentioned by the Protocol, including the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the civil society.

90. Since last July, significant progress was made in the promotion of peace and security. However, there are still many challenges to be overcome, whether regarding the implementation of already concluded peace agreements or the search for solutions to ongoing conflicts. Consequently, there is a need for sustained and regular action on the part of the PSC as well as African leaders and other competent African bodies, in order, with the support of international partners, to make peace and security a tangible reality throughout the Continent.

91. The efforts made during the period under review have, once again, highlighted that one of the main constraints facing the AU and the regional organizations related to the lack of adequate financial resources and their almost exclusive reliance on resources provided by partners. While the assistance of AU partners is welcome and should continue to be sought, it is equally important that African countries contribute more significantly to the funding of peace efforts on the continent.

92. Furthermore, the developments which took place during the period under consideration highlighted the challenges posed by the tension and disputes that frequently characterize electoral processes in the Continent. This situation constitutes a challenge for the Continent and calls for appropriate solutions to be found, failing which the democratization process set in motion in the Continent since the early 90s will be undermined and weakened. It was in this context that the PSC at its meeting of 18 January 2008, underscored the need to initiate a collective reflection on the challenges linked to the tension and contestations which often characterize the electoral process in Africa, including the building of African capacities, at national, regional and continental levels, in the area of election observation and monitoring.

ASSEMBLY/AU/3 (X)
ANNEX I

**MEETINGS AND BRIEFING SESSIONS OF THE PEACE AND
SECURITY COUNCIL, JULY 2007– JANUARY 2008**

**MEETINGS AND BRIEFING SESSIONS OF THE PEACE AND
SECURITY COUNCIL, JULY 2007– JANUARY 2008**

Meeting/ Briefing	<u>Date</u>	<u>Agenda</u>	Working Documents	Communiqué/Other Output
	5 – 6 July 2007 Dakar (Senegal)	Retreat of the Peace and Security Council	Background paper on the Review of the Working Methods of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union; Report of the Third Brainstorming Retreat of African Ambassadors in Addis Ababa on the African Union Peace and Security Agenda, 1 - 4 May 2004 Cape Town, South Africa	Conclusions of the working methods of the PSC. PSC/PR/2(LXXXIII)
80 th	18 July 2007	Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia	Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia. PSC/PR/2(LXXX)	Communiqué on the Situation in Somalia. PSC/PR/Comm.(LXXX)

81 st	20 July 2007	Consideration of the information note on the implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement of 7 September 2006 between the Government of the Republic of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL	Information note on the implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement of 7 September 2006 between the Government of the Republic of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL	Communiqué on the implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement of 7 September 2006 between the Government of the Republic of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL. PSC/PR/Comm.(LXXXI)
Meeting/ Briefing	<u>Date</u>	<u>Agenda</u>	Working Documents	Communiqué/Other Output
82 nd	23 July 2007	Briefing by the Commission on the Situation in the Comoros		Press Statement on the Situation in the Comoros. PSC/PR/PS.(LXXXII)
83 rd	30 July 2007	Adoption of the conclusions of the brainstorming Retreat of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held in Dakar, Senegal, 5 – 6 July 2007	Conclusions of the Retreat of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union Dakar, Senegal, 5 – 6 July 2007 PSC/PR/2(LXXXIII)	
84 th	31 July 2007	Consideration of the renewal of the mandate of the African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES)		Communiqué on the renewal of the mandate of the African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros. PSC/PR/Comm.(LXXXIV)
85 th	8 August 2007	Conclusions of the Retreat of the PSC of the African Union held in Dakar, Senegal, 5 – 6 July 2007		Communiqué on the working methods of the PSC. PSC/PR/Comm.(LXXXV)

86 th	10 August 2007	Update on the implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement of 7 September 2006 between the Government of the republic of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL		Communiqué on the status of implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement of 7 September 2006 between the Government of the republic of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL. PSC/PR/Comm.(LXXXVI)
Meeting/ Briefing	<u>Date</u>	<u>Agenda</u>	Working Documents	Communiqué/Other Output
87 th	13 August 2007	Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Comoros	Report of the Chairperson on the Situation in the Comoros. PSC/PR/2(LXXXVII)	Communiqué on the Situation in the Comoros. PSC/PR/Comm(LXXXVII)
88 th	14 August 2007	Update on the political process in Darfur	Briefing Notes by Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Special Envoy of the AU, on the Status of the Implementation of the AU-UN Road-Map for Peace in Darfur.	Press Statement on Briefing by Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, AU Special Envoy for Darfur, on the Status of the Implementation of the AU-UN Road-Map for Peace in Darfur.
89 th	24 August 2007	Consideration of the status of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)	Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the implementation process of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). PSC/PR/2(LXXXIX)	Communiqué on the implementation process of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). PSC/PR/Comm.(LXXXIX)

90 th	27 August 2007	Consideration of the Report of the PSC Assessment Mission to the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic	Report of the African Union Peace and Security Council Assessment Mission to the Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic (21 to 24 May 2007 AND 5 to 11 June 2007). PSC/PR/2(XC)	Communiqué on the outcome of the Assessment Mission undertaken by a delegation of the Council to the Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic from 21 to 24 May 2007 and from 5 to 11 June 2007. PSC/PR/Comm.(XC)
91 st	28 August 2007	Briefing by the Facilitation Team on the Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement in Burundi		
Meeting/ Briefing	<u>Date</u>	<u>Agenda</u>	Working Documents	Communiqué/Other Output
92 nd	26 September 2007	Briefing on the outcome of the meeting between the AU and the Regional economic Communities (RECs) held in Kampala, Uganda, from 31 August to 2 September 2007, on the Memorandum of understanding (MoU)	Draft memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the coordinating mechanisms of the regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa AU-RECs/EXP/2(II)	
93 rd	27 September 2007	Briefing on the outcome of the meeting of the Ministerial Committee of the Countries of the Region on the Comoros		Press Statement on the Comoros.

		Briefing on the planned Solidarity conference with the Central African Republic (CAR)		Press Statement on Central African Republic (CAR).
94 th	2 October 2007	Briefing on incidents in Haskanita, Darfur, Sudan		Press Statement on the attack on the AMIS camp in Haskanita, South Darfur, and the killing of 10 AMIS personnel.
95 th	10 October 2007	Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Comoros	Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Comoros. PSC/PR/2(XCV)	Communiqué on the Situation in the Comoros. PSC/PR/Comm.(XCV)
96 th	23 October 2007	Briefing on the status of implementation of AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)		Press Statement on the status of implementation of the AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
Meeting/ Briefing	<u>Date</u>	<u>Agenda</u>	Working Documents	Communiqué/Other Output
97 th	25 October 2007	Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in DRC. PSC/PR/2(XCVII)	Communiqué on the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). PSC/PR/Comm.(XCVII)
98 th	8 November 2007 23 November 2007	Briefing on Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations Deliberation on Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations in follow-up to the briefing held on 8 November 2007	Decision on the activities of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the state of peace and security in Africa Doc.Assembly/AU/3(VIII) Joint Communiqué agreed by the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security	Contribution of the African Union to the Report to be submitted by the United Nations Secretary-General in pursuance of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Presidential Statement of 28 March 2007 on the relationship

			Council, 16 June 2007 Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2007/7	between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security PSC/PR/2(XCVIII)
99 th	9 November 2007	Briefing by the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)		Press Statement on the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Africa. PSC/PR/BR.(XCIX)
100 th	12 November 2007	Consideration of the revised Draft Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise within the Framework of Article 11 of the PSC Protocol	Draft Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise	
Meeting/ Briefing	<u>Date</u>	<u>Agenda</u>	Working Documents	Communiqué/Other Output
101 st	21 November 2007	Briefing on the Establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF)	Progress Report on the establishment of the ASF; Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);	Press Statement on the Establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF). PSC/PR/BR.(CI)

			North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG); Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)	
102 nd	26 November 2007	Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the follow-up of the Communiqué of the 95 th meeting of the PSC on the Situation in the Comoros	Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the follow-up of the Communiqué of the 95 th meeting of the PSC on the Situation in the Comoros PSC/PR/2(CII)	Communiqué on the Situation in the Comorian Island of Anjouan PSC/PR/Comm.(CII)
103 rd	29 November 2007	Briefing on the implementation process of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in the Sudan Briefing on the Situation in Somalia		Press Statement on the implementation process of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in the Sudan PSC/PR/BR(CIII)
Meeting/ Briefing	<u>Date</u>	<u>Agenda</u>	Working Documents	Communiqué/Other Output
104 th	20 December 2007	Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson on the Situation in Côte d'Ivoire Briefing on the Situation in Somalia	Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Côte d'Ivoire PSC/PR/2(CIV)	Communiqué on the Situation in Côte d'Ivoire PSC/PR/Comm.(CIV) (1) Press Statement on the Situation in Somalia PSC/PR/BR(CIV) (2)
105 th	18 January 2008	Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia	Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia PSC/PR/2(CV)	Communiqué on the Situation in Somalia PSC/PR/Comm.(CV)

106 th	19 January 2008	Briefing on the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo		Press Statement PSC/PR/BR(CVI)
107 th	21 January 2008	Briefing on the Situation in the Comoros		Press Statement PSC/PR/BR/PS/2(CVII)
108 th	21 January 2008	Cooperation between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and relevant international organizations within the context of Article 17(4) of the PSC Protocol		Press Statement PSC/PR/BR(CVIII)
109 th	21 January 2008	Briefing on the Situation in Kenya		Press Statement PSC/PR/BR(CIX)

ASSEMBLY/AU/3 (X)
Annex II

**REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA**

AFRICAN UNION

الاتحاد الأفريقي



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**PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
105TH MEETING
18 JANUARY 2008
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA**

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ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA**

REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In the communiqué on the situation in Somalia adopted at its 80th meeting held on 18 July 2007 [PSC/PR/Comm(LXXX)], Council decided, *inter-alia*, to extend the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for an additional period of six months. In the press statement adopted by its 104th meeting held on 20 December 2007 [PSC/PR/BR/(CIV) (2)], Council, having stressed that the situation in Somalia represents one of the most serious peace and security challenges facing the continent, agreed to meet by mid-January 2008, before the expiry of the mandate of AMISOM, to review the situation and determine the best way forward in preparation for the 11th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, scheduled to take place from 31 January to 2 February 2008, in Addis Ababa.

2. This report, which is submitted in accordance with the above-mentioned communiqué and press statement, covers the political, security and humanitarian developments in Somalia since last July, as well as issues relating to the deployment of AMISOM and the implementation of the arms embargo imposed on Somalia by Security Council resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992. It concludes with recommendations on how best the African Union (AU) could further support the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

3. One of the major political developments during the period under review was the convening of the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC), in Mogadishu, from 15 July to 30 August 2007. Over 2,600 delegates took part in the Congress, which was independently organized and managed by a National Governance and Reconciliation Committee (NGRC) headed by former President Ali Mahdi Mohamed. However, some of the actors who could have contributed significantly to the NRC decided to stay away; these included a section of the Hawiye clan in Mogadishu, as well as opposition groups based abroad. The AU, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda sent officials to the opening ceremony. Representatives of the international community based in Nairobi, who were expected to travel to Mogadishu, did not finally attend the opening ceremony, due to security concerns.

4. Council will recall that, at its meeting of 18 July 2007, it welcomed the launching of the NRC as a significant step towards an all-inclusive and genuine reconciliation process, within the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC). In this respect, Council requested all the representatives of the Somali people participating in the Congress to bear their responsibilities and engage constructively in the process, and to seek peaceful solutions to the problems facing Somalia. It urged the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), in keeping with the objective of the NRC, to spare no effort to reach

out to all sections of the Somali population, with a view to facilitating the reconciliation process.

5. In its resolution 1772 (2007) of 20 August 2007, the United Nations Security Council also welcomed the convening of the NRC, urged the TFIs and all parties in Somalia to respect the conclusions of the Congress and to sustain an equally inclusive ongoing political process thereafter, and encouraged them to unite behind the efforts to promote such an inclusive dialogue. The Security Council reiterated the need for the ongoing political process to agree both on a comprehensive and lasting cessation of hostilities and to produce a roadmap for a comprehensive peace process, including democratic elections at the local, regional and national levels, as set out in the TFC.

6. Immediately after the opening, the NRC went into bridging the existing inter-clan, as well as intra-clan differences, which have now become central to the crisis in Somalia. The early discussions were marked by solemn expressions of repentance for the wrongs committed and declarations of amity and reconciliation. The second phase of the Congress debated the programmes of the Government in general and sought to chart out a roadmap towards progress in governance and development. During this phase, particular attention was paid to the establishment of basic administrative structures and the re-invigoration of the judicial system, as crucial components towards the consolidation of peace and security.

7. Significantly, the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) adopted, earlier on, formal decisions to recognize the NRC, and undertook to institute legislation necessary for the implementation of the recommendations of the Congress. A similar undertaking to ensure the implementation of those recommendations was made by the President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

8. The Congress concluded its deliberations with the parties agreeing on a number of issues. Among others, mention should be made of the announcement of an end to the civil war and conflicts that have torn Somalia apart since 1978; the call on all Somali parties to voluntarily disarm and return looted property; the request to the TFIs to implement all the constitutional processes provided for by the TFC that would lead to the achievement of federalism in the country; the conduct of a population census, and the holding of free and fair elections that would usher in a democratically elected government before the end of 2009. The Congress also called for the establishment of an effective government, whose members would be drawn both from within and outside the TFP.

9. At the closing of the NRC, President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed pledged to continue the dialogue process. Furthermore, just prior to the conclusion of the NRC, members of the international community supporting the Congress, including the AU, met with the NGRC Chairman, in Nairobi. On that occasion, they stressed the need to devise ways to fully implement the outcome of the Congress, to pursue efforts to reach out to all opposition groups both within and outside Somalia, as well the need for the TFIs to fulfil their obligations under the TFC, especially with regard to federalism, the constitutional process and the preparations for elections. In a separate meeting with Mr. Ali Mahdi,

my then Special Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Muhammad Ali Fom, insisted on the need to urgently establish a mechanism to ensure the implementation of the NRC recommendations.

10. Following the conclusion of the NRC, the TFG President, Abdullahi Yusuf, the then Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Gedi, the Speaker of the TFP, Adam Mohammed Nour, the Chairman of the NGRC, Ali Mahdi, as well as tribal sheiks and other representatives of various Somali factions, travelled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Under the auspices of King Abdullah, the Somali leaders signed, on 16 September 2007, an agreement regarding the implementation of the recommendations made by the NRC. In the remarks he made on the occasion, King Abdullah urged the Somali parties to follow through the undertakings made, stressing that “reaching an agreement is the first step and must be followed by a full commitment to its provisions, as well as hard work to put it into practice”. On his part, President Abdullahi Yusuf called for the deployment of a joint Arab-African force in Somalia, under the command of the United Nations, to restore peace and security in his country, and urged all Somalis to back such a force. The agreement reached in Jeddah was rejected by the opposition groups, in particular the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).

11. In the meantime, the various opposition groups met in Asmara from 6 to 13 September 2007, where they held a parallel Congress, attended, among others, by representatives of UIC, the ‘Free Parliamentarians’ led by the former Speaker of the TFP, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, members of the Somali Diaspora and some clan leaders. The meeting agreed on the formation of an Alliance for the Liberation and Reconstitution of Somalia, with the stated aim of liberating Somalia from “Ethiopian occupation” and launching a political process that would involve all Somali stakeholders and rebuild the Somali state. The Alliance, which predicated talks with the TFG on an Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia, elected Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a senior UIC member, as Chairman of its executive committee, while former TFP Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden was appointed Chairman of its Central Committee, which comprises 191 members. The TFG dismissed the Alliance as a terrorist one, stating that it did not pose a real threat. Furthermore, members of the opposition to the TFG, including from the Hawiye clan, disassociated themselves from the Asmara conference and its outcome.

12. On 10 September 2007, the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia met in Rome. The meeting, at which the AU was represented, welcomed the commitments of the NRC, as well as those of President Abdullahi Yusuf made at the closing session of the Congress to “pave a new political path that will win the confidence of the Somali people” and to continue the dialogue process. The ICG called upon the TFIs to implement in good faith the recommendations of the NRC, including the urgent elaboration of a roadmap for the remainder of the transitional period. During the meeting, the AU offered to host the next meeting of the ICG, at its headquarters, in Addis Ababa. Subsequently, the Commission initiated steps for this meeting to take place towards mid-December 2007. The idea was to organize this session of the ICG back-to-back with an AU-sponsored high-level meeting on Somalia that would bring together regional, continental and international stakeholders, with a view to re-focussing

international attention on the situation and promoting a concerted and better coordinated approach in support of the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia. However, due to calendar constraints, the Commission could not proceed with its plan. Efforts will continue to be made for the convening of the meeting at the appropriate time.

13. The period under consideration also witnessed heightened tension within the TFG, with a deepening rift between President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister Ali Gedi over issues of transparency and accountability, as well as diverging interpretations of the TFC regarding the term of office of the Prime Minister and the implications thereof. This tension was eventually overcome with the resignation of Mr. Gedi. In an address to the TFP, in Baidoa, on 29 October 2007, Mr. Gedi called on all the members of the Parliament to stand firmly behind the TFG, stressing that, “for all its imperfections, it provides a blueprint for the way forward towards the creation of a new state and for development in Somalia”. He stated that time had come for someone else to lead the Government and take the ongoing process in Somalia to its next stage, and confirmed that he had offered his resignation to the President. On his part, President Abdullahi Yusuf issued a declaration accepting the resignation of Mr. Gedi, seen as a remedy to the then unfolding constitutional crisis, and stating, among others, that there would be no “exclusion and marginalization of the associates of the Prime Minister or any other negative action against them”.

14. Subsequently, Deputy Prime Minister Salim Aliyow Ibrow was appointed as acting Prime Minister. He has since been replaced by Nur Hassan Hussien, a former Head of the ICRC in Somalia. Following extensive consultations, the Prime Minister has now formed a new cabinet based, as the previous one, on the 4.5 clan power sharing formula. The TFP has overwhelmingly endorsed the new cabinet, which includes a substantial number of technocrats, including those from the Diaspora. The first cabinet appointed by the Prime Minister was met with strong disapproval within the TFP, as well as the international community, and, as a result, had to be dissolved even before being presented to Parliament – among others, mention should be made here of the fact that only a few of its members were non-parliamentarians, although the TFP had amended the TFC to allow appointing ministers from outside Parliament.

15. I am glad to note that, since his appointment, the new Prime Minister has repeatedly stressed that reconciliation would be at the core of his activities during his tenure in office. In this respect, it is worth noting the assurances he gave to the AU, as well as to the participants to the meeting convened by the United States’ Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, in Addis Ababa, on 5 December 2007, to discuss developments pertaining to peace and security in the region. In a presidential statement adopted on 19 December 2007, the Security Council, on its part, welcomed the appointment of the new Somali Prime Minister. The Security Council stressed that his appointment offered a renewed opportunity to make further progress on political reconciliation, addressing the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, and on implementing the outcomes of the NRC, leading to a roadmap for the remainder of the transitional period and democratic elections in Somalia, as set out in the TFC.

16. On 17 December 2007, the new Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, briefed the Security Council on the situation on Somalia. On that occasion, he proposed three possible approaches regarding the involvement of the international community in Somalia: *status quo*, with the continuation of the current “business as usual” attitude, with the attendant likelihood of further divisions and violence; organized withdrawal of the international community, which, in effect, would recognize its inability to protect the population and bring about a lasting peace; and, finally, an immediate and effective action both on the political and security fronts, including the establishment of a government of national unity and the deployment of extra troops to reinforce AMISOM and stabilize the country. In its 19 December presidential statement, the Security Council, while strongly supporting the efforts of the Special Representative, indicated that it was looking forward to hearing more details on the proposals he submitted.

17. In an effort to enhance AU's efforts in support of the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, I appointed, in October 2007, a new Special Representative for Somalia, in the person of Mr. Nicolas Bwakira. Mr. Bwakira, a Burundian national, has held several senior international positions, including that of Director for Africa at the UNHCR. I would like to seize this opportunity to pay tribute to my former Special Representative, Ambassador Ali Fom, for his tireless efforts and commitment and for the key role he played both during the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, held in Kenya from October 2002 to October 2004, and in subsequent initiatives aimed at furthering peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

18. Following his appointment, Mr. Bwakira undertook, in December last year, visits to Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, to establish initial contacts with the national authorities concerned, as well as with members of the international community, including the United Nations, the European Union (EU) and AU's bilateral partners, and representatives of regional and international NGOs. He seized the opportunity to stress the need for renewed and concerted efforts to overcome the current difficulties in Somalia and to reiterate AU's determination to do whatever it can to contribute to the early restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. My Special Representative is scheduled to travel to the other countries of the region for further consultations. In the meantime, steps are underway to staff his office with the required personnel as well as facilitate his early deployment to Mogadishu, to assume the overall leadership of AMISOM.

III. SECURITY SITUATION

19. While the TFG and Ethiopian forces have continued to make sustained efforts to improve security in the country, the overall situation remains precarious. In Mogadishu, there is an average of 5 to 6 incidents per day. Most of the incidents reported during the period under consideration involved the use of grenade attacks, roadside bombs, mortar attacks and small arms fire against the TFG and Ethiopian forces, as well as clashes between the security forces and anti-government elements, many of whom are believed to belong to the extremist al-Shabaab militia, the youth wing of the UIC.

20. The attacks by the armed elements opposed to the TFG increased significantly immediately after the NRC, in October, but abated thereafter, following the intensification, in November, by the Ethiopian and TFG forces of their operations, particularly in the districts where these armed elements are reported to be hiding. On 12 December 2007, the newly Ethiopian trained Somali troops were deployed in Northern Mogadishu. These better-trained and equipped troops have made it possible to enhance the presence of the Government forces on the ground.

21. Over the past weeks, the anti-government forces have spread their activities to regions that were previously peaceful, though not necessarily under Government control. Their strategy seems to be to further weaken the TFG by destabilising as many areas as possible, fully aware of the fact that the Government does not, at the moment, have the capacity to deploy significant numbers of troops in all the regions.

22. In the Middle and Lower Jubba regions, the al Shabaab are reported to be training new recruits and planning attacks, taking advantage of the instability created by clashes between clans, especially over revenue collected from the Kisimayo port. Armed elements are also reported to be using the Lower Shebelle region to ferry arms. Recently, the TFG forces in the area were attacked and forced to withdraw to Bardoogle. In the Bay region, there have also been stepped up attacks on TFG and Ethiopian positions. Baidoa being the town that hosts the TFP and the majority of the TFG Ministers, the presence of these armed groups poses a real threat. In Bakool, the situation is not different. Due to insurgent threats, since 17 December 2007, the Governor and his key staff have relocated to Baidoa. In Galgaduud, where the presence of the TFG is limited and which is the home of former UIC Chair, Cheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the regional Governor and police commander are reported to have left the region for Galkayo, in Puntland, citing threats by elements belonging to the UIC.

23. During the past months, there has been increased tension between the semi-autonomous region of Puntland and the self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland. On 17 September 2007, forces loyal to Puntland's authorities clashed with local pro-Somaliland militias near Laascaanood, the capital of the disputed Sool region, in the central north of Somalia. The fighting, which continued sporadically for the remainder of September 2007, escalated in October, claiming several lives and leading to a further deterioration of the situation in the Sool and Sanaag regions. Laascaanood has since remained under the control of the Somaliland forces. At the time of finalizing this report, there were reports of fresh fighting between the two sides. These repeated clashes, which are a matter of deep concern, particularly as they affect an area that had previously largely remained peaceful, are linked to conflicting territorial claims by the two sides: while Puntland claims parts of the area in view of the ethnic make up of its inhabitants and their clan ties to Puntland, Somaliland maintains that the disputed region lies within its colonial era borders.

24. The period under review also witnessed incidents involving AMISOM. On 8 October 2007, mortar attacks targeted AMISOM position at Kilometre 4; there were no casualties. On 24 October, three soldiers suffered minor injuries following a grenade attack on the Mission's position at Km 4. On 19 December, insurgents attacked

AMISOM troops guarding the airport; the attack was repulsed without any casualties on the side of AMISOM.

25. Somalia is one of the highest-risk areas for piracy in the world. According to available statistics, during the first nine months of 2007, 26 incidents against ships sailing in or near Somali waters were recorded, a further indication of the absence of effective coastal surveillance in the country. Over the past years, the AU has regularly been approached by a number of countries whose citizens were taken hostage or kidnapped in Somali waters. For instance, on 26 August 2007, the Government of Pakistan formally wrote to the Commission for it to assist in securing the release of two vessels and their crews hijacked by pirates around Somalia.

26. This situation, amongst others, poses a threat to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, especially since about 80% of the assistance to Somalia by the World Food Programme (WFP) is shipped by sea. It is against this background that the WFP and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) made appeals for concerted international efforts to address the problem and that the United Nations Security Council, in its resolution 1772 (2007), “encouraged member states whose naval vessels and military aircrafts operate in international waters and airspace adjacent to the coast of Somalia to be vigilant to any incident of piracy therein and to take appropriate action to protect merchant shipping, in particular the transportation of humanitarian aid, against any such act, in line with relevant international law”. On 2 October 2007, the French Government wrote to the Commission to confirm France’s readiness, through its navy, to escort ships transporting WFP humanitarian supplies to Somalia. I would like to welcome the concrete steps that have since been taken by the French Government, as well as the consultations undertaken with the AU in this respect in order to facilitate coordination with AMISOM, especially when the escorted ships are about to dock.

IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

27. The prevailing insecurity in Mogadishu, in particular, and in Somalia, in general, has negatively impacted on the humanitarian situation in the country. The violence and fighting in Mogadishu have resulted in a number of casualties among the civilian population, especially in the months of October and November 2007. Furthermore, there have been, over the past months, massive displacements of civilian population. According to the United Nations, over 240,000 people have moved out of Mogadishu since the end of October 2007; in mid-December, the total number of civilians who fled the city in 2007 was estimated at about 600,000. While the prevailing insecurity in Mogadishu stands out as the major cause of these displacements, other secondary factors are also at play: they include lack of livelihood and requests by the authorities that people evacuate some neighbourhoods to facilitate the search operations conducted by the Government forces in order to rout out insurgent elements, as part of their efforts to restore security.

28. While most of the IDPs went to the Lower Shabelle region, especially Afgooye, 30 km west of Mogadishu, large numbers of people fled even further to Bay, Mudug and Hiraaan regions. These movements of population constitute an additional burden for host

communities that are already facing an acute humanitarian situation, compounded by the disruption, as a result of insecurity, of the livestock and agricultural markets in Mogadishu, which provide crucial income for the producers based in the Lower and Middle Shabelle. It should also be noted that the fighting that took place in the Sool region between Puntland and Somaliland forces has also led to large-scale displacement. About 30,000 displaced people are reported to be vulnerable and in need of assistance.

29. The prevailing insecurity constitutes a serious constraint for the delivery of assistance to the needy population, especially as incidents targeting the humanitarian organisations and workers continue to be reported. Humanitarian efforts are further hindered by *ad hoc* roadblocks, including on the Mogadishu/ Afgooye road, which is a major area of humanitarian operations. Despite exemptions granted by the TFG, humanitarian workers indicate that they are often requested to pay taxes at these roadblocks, whose number reached 336 in the month of November 2007. As a result, the cost of transportation has increased, while the delivery of much needed humanitarian assistance is being further delayed.

30. In view of this situation, I welcome the discussions between the United Nations and the Somali authorities in order to address the problems being encountered and overcome the mistrust between the TFG and the international humanitarian agencies, as well as the pledge by Prime Minister Hassan Hussein that his Government will fully support the relief efforts. On its part, the Commission has seized every opportunity to impress upon the Somali authorities on the need to do all they can to facilitate the work of the humanitarian organizations and access to needy populations.

31. In spite of the challenging environment in which they are operating, the humanitarian organisations continue to play an important role in alleviating the suffering of the affected population. Thus, a “wet feeding” programme was initiated in Mogadishu, while food distribution benefiting about 180,000 people has taken place along the Mogadishu/Afgooye road. Furthermore, several WFP ships escorted by the French navy and carrying food aid docked at Marka seaport. Immunisation campaign aimed at reaching children and women in several settlements situated along the Mogadishu/Afgooye road have also been undertaken. It should be pointed out that the relief work in Somalia is carried out by local partners and national staff of international NGOs and UN agencies as the security conditions do not make it possible to deploy international staff. I would like to express AU’s appreciation to all the personnel concerned for their courage and dedication.

32. The Consolidated Appeal (CAP) for Somalia for the year 2008, which was launched on 11 December 2007, amounts to US\$ 406 million, out of which a little over 26 million are already available. Among others, the priorities identified in the CAP revolve around the following: provision of assistance to about 1,5 million needy people; protection of, and respect for, human rights, and enhancement of local capacity for the delivery of basic social services and for disaster preparedness and response. I appeal to the international community, including Member States in a position to do so, to contribute financial assistance to cover the outstanding requirements of the CAP. The

2007 CAP amounted to US\$ 383 million, out of which 275 million were received by mid-December.

33. As part of its mandate, and in spite of the constraints facing the Mission, AMISOM has continued to provide medical services, including treatment for minor illnesses, gunshot wounds, pregnant women and children, to between 200 and 500 people a month. It also provides water to the population residing within the immediate surroundings of the Mission's Headquarters, in Mogadishu.

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF AMISOM MANDATE AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR A POSSIBLE UN OPERATION

34. During the period under review, no significant progress was made in strengthening AMISOM, owing to the continued financial and logistical constraints facing the Commission. The total budget for AMISOM for a year amounts to about US\$ 622 million. So far, a little over US\$ 32 million have been contributed, originating exclusively from AU partners, namely the EU, Italy, Sweden, China and the League of Arab States. The United Kingdom has pledged £ 8.5 million for AMISOM deployment, and provided assistance for the establishment of AMISOM Support Management Planning Unit (SMPU). The EU has also pledged 5 million Euro for the SPMU and another 500,000 to cover insurance cost, in addition to technical assistance for budget related matters. The United Nations has deployed a team of military and civilian experts to the AU Headquarters to support mission planning and management. Furthermore, the US continues to provide significant logistical support to the Ugandan contingent, as well as communication equipment for the Mission's strategic Headquarters in Addis Ababa, and has pledged to facilitate transportation to Somalia for Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). NATO has also pledged to airlift troops to Somalia. Also, as reported to Council earlier, Algeria provided airlift for the initial deployment, while Kenya offered other facilities in support of the operation. On its part, Nigeria pledged a financial contribution of US\$ 2 million. Yet it is clear that the resources and the logistical support mobilized so far fall far short of what is required for the full deployment of AMISOM and the sustenance of its operations.

35. As a result, to date, out of the 8,000 troops authorized by Council in January 2007, only 2 Ugandan battalions and an advance team of 192 Burundian soldiers, which were deployed on 23 and 24 December 2007, are on the ground, in Mogadishu. However, at the time of finalizing this report, steps were underway to deploy the main body of the first of the two battalions pledged by Burundi. The US is providing the support required for the ongoing Burundian deployment. The remaining Burundian battalion is ready for deployment, but assistance has yet to be mobilized for major equipment, in-theatre logistical support, and payment of troops allowances. No timetable has yet been set for the deployment of the contingents pledged by Ghana (350) and Nigeria (1 battalion of 850). In this respect, it should be noted that a Ghanaian envoy visited Addis Ababa to discuss issues relating to the deployment of the Ghanaian contingent; the Commission also intends to dispatch a team to Nigeria to follow-up on the pledge made by that country. During the period under review, no new contributions of troops were recorded. The Member States approached by the Commission either

indicated that they were not in a position to deploy troops or are yet to formally communicate their responses.

36. Consequently, AMISOM has not been able to expand its activities. The Mission continues to provide VIP escort, to conduct confidence-building patrols within its immediate area of operations and to ensure the protection of the airport, seaport, Kilometer 4 and Villa Somalia, which hosts the presidency. AMISOM also contributed to ensuring security during the convening of the NRC. Furthermore, the Mission has continued to receive weapons surrendered by various armed elements for storage and destruction. Finally, and as indicated above, the Mission provides limited humanitarian support to the local population, as well as on-demand escort for humanitarian organizations.

37. I would like, once again, to express my appreciation to the Ugandan troops for their efforts, in spite of the very challenging conditions in which they are working. My appreciation also goes to the Ugandan Government for its continued commitment to the promotion of lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia. I also wish to commend the Government of Burundi for providing troops to AMISOM. I would like to seize this opportunity to express gratitude to Member States and all AU partners that have made contributions in support of AMISOM.

38. In late September, the Commission organized a five-day working visit for the African Defence Attaché based in Addis Ababa. During the visit, they held discussions with AMISOM Force Commander and TFG officials. This provided them with a better understanding of the needs of AMISOM in terms of strength and equipment. A similar visit is planned for non-African Defense Attaché, with the view to providing them with first hand information on the situation and the needs of AMISOM.

39. As Council is aware, AMISOM is tasked to provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support for the disarmament and stabilization efforts. It is in this context that, in early October last year, following a request by the TFG, the Commission, together with the Nairobi-based Regional Centre for Small Arms in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (RECSA), convened a meeting to discuss issues of small arms in Somalia. The meeting, which included participants from the SPMU, UNDP Somalia Office and the TFG, recommended that an AU-led mission including relevant international organizations be undertaken to Mogadishu to: assess the extent to which action can be undertaken in the area of DDR in Somalia under current circumstances; discuss how to integrate small arms and DDR activities into the work of AMISOM; look at ways in which the capacity of the relevant Somali institutions could be strengthened; and assess the situation surrounding stockpile management of the weapons collected by AMISOM and identify ways to improve it. The mission will travel to Mogadishu as soon as the required preparations are finalized.

40. As part of the implementation of the Mission's mandate, the SPMU, thanks to financial support provided by the Italian Government, organized two coordinating and information sharing meetings with major United Nations and other humanitarian agencies in Nairobi and Addis Ababa, respectively from 11 to 16 November and 6 to 9

December 2007. The main objectives of the workshops were to identify areas of synergy and collaboration between AMISOM and other actors in Somalia, to support AMISOM planning capability, and to articulate coordinated responses to the current needs of Somalia through exchange of information. A number of recommendations were made, including the establishment of a working group bringing together all stakeholders, the review of AMISOM mandate to highlight protection and human rights issues, the institutionalization of joint AMISOM/UN visits to Somalia, and a strengthened political presence in Mogadishu to support more effectively the reconciliation process. A final meeting is expected to take place in the coming weeks to consolidate the recommendations made and pave the way for their implementation.

41. As indicated above, on 18 July 2007, Council extended the mandate of AMISOM for a further period of 6 months, a decision welcomed by the United Nations Security Council in its resolution 1772 (2007) of 20 August 2007. In that decision, Council reiterated its urgent call to the AU Member States and partners to provide the necessary financial, logistical and technical support to make it possible for AMISOM to rapidly attain its authorized strength and continue its operations. It also called on all Member States to contribute troops and other personnel required for AMISOM. Council stressed, once again, the need for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia that will take over from AMISOM and support the long-term stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia. Pending such a deployment, Council called on the United Nations to put in place a financial, logistical and technical support package for AMISOM, within the context of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.

42. As a follow-up to this decision, I wrote, on 4 August 2007, to the United Nations Secretary-General, echoing the call by Council for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia and the provision, in the meantime, of support to AMISOM. While concurring with the position expressed by the Secretary-General in his 25 June 2007 report on the situation in Somalia that a UN operation would only succeed if deployed in support of a political process and not as a substitution for one, I expressed the hope that the United Nations would look at the situation in Somalia with the required flexibility, bearing in mind that the political and peacekeeping aspects are closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing. In this respect, I referred to the NRC, which was then ongoing, and to the duty of the international community to encourage the Somalis and provide further support in order to enhance the prospects of lasting peace and reconciliation. I stressed that failure by the international community to act swiftly in support of the ongoing process could undermine the modest progress already achieved in Somalia, with far-reaching regional implications and further suffering for the Somali people.

43. In response, the UN Secretary-General wrote to me on 24 September 2007. In his letter, he indicated that, in his view, the most immediate priority for the international community at this stage is to assist in bringing together all Somali groups under a credible and genuine peace process. He stated that it was crucial to ensure that the conditions set out in his 25 June report are in place before the possible deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation, adding that, in the view of the United Nations, the NRC had

not been able to create such conditions and, therefore, would not justify a review of the UN position. At the same time, he expressed United Nations' readiness to explore with the AU how the UN may provide further assistance in strengthening and expanding the presence of AMISOM on the ground.

44. In his report of 7 November 2007 on the situation in Somalia, the Secretary-General reiterated his belief that, under the prevailing political and security situation, the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation cannot be considered a realistic and viable option. He proposed to look at additional security options, including the deployment of a robust multinational force or coalition of the willing. On its part, the Security Council, both in its resolution 1772 (2007) and presidential statement of 19 December 2007, urged the international community to provide support to AMISOM, and requested the Secretary-General to consult with the AU on what further support might be provided to the Mission and to continue to develop the existing contingency plan for the possible deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation to succeed AMISOM. At the time of finalizing this report, a United Nations team was in Addis Ababa for consultation with the Commission as part of the assessment of AMISOM needs and the type of support it needs, as well as of the continuing process of developing the existing contingency plan.

VI. ARMS EMBARGO

45. As Council is aware, the United Nations Security Council, through resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, decided that all states shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until it decides otherwise. Since then, there have been continued efforts to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo and ensure compliance with the Security Council resolution.

46. On 17 July 2007, the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia. In its report, the Monitoring Group stated that Somalia was "literally awash with arms". The Monitoring Group indicated that "the sheer quantities, numbers and diversity of arms, especially in Central and Southern Somalia, are greater than at any time since the early 1990s". The majority of arms, it was stated, "appear to have been brought into Somalia via clandestine roads and have found their way to a variety of key Somali actors", while "other quantities of arms have also been clandestinely brought into Somalia for the various other key Somali actors...., one of the prime avenues being the arm dealers from the Bakaraaha arms market", in Mogadishu.

47. The Monitoring Group made a number of recommendations aimed at enhancing compliance with the arms embargo. It, however, indicated that successful implementation of these recommendations would depend on the establishment of a viable Government in Somalia. The Group stressed the need for the TFG to "clearly establish its authority and accompanying governmental institutions before the continuous and vexing problems associated with widespread insecurity can be brought

under control". It identified, among others factors contributing to insecurity, the continued arms flows and powerful independent armed groups outside the control of the TFG, overall lack of regulatory control of the economy, and lack of control over Somalia's borders and coastal waters.

48. In its resolution 1766 (2007) of 23 July 2007, the Security Council stressed the obligation of all Member States to comply fully with the measures imposed by resolution 733 (1992), and expressed its intention, in light of the report of the Monitoring Group, to consider specific action to improve implementation and compliance with the arms embargo. At the same time, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the Monitoring Group, requesting the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to re-establish the Group for a further six months. In its resolution 1772 (2007) of 20 August 2007, the Security Council emphasized the continued contribution made to Somalia's peace and security by the arms embargo, demanded that all Member States, in particular those of the region, fully comply with it, and reiterated its intention to consider urgently ways to strengthen its effectiveness, including through targeted measures.

49. On 14 December 2007, the coordinator of the Monitoring Group wrote to the Commission, seeking AMISOM's agreement for a visit to the arms storage facility put in place by the Mission in Mogadishu, in order to take the details of the arms seized or discovered, and launch investigations on the producers of those weapons and the delivery channels. At the time of finalizing this report, the Commission was considering how best it could facilitate the proposed visit by the Monitoring Group.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

50. Looking at the developments of the last six months, one cannot but recognize that the progress made towards lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia remains extremely limited. More than fifteen years after the onset of the civil war and nearly four years following the conclusion of the IGAD-sponsored Reconciliation Conference in Kenya, Somalia continues to be plagued by persistent violence and insecurity, the absence of effective governance structures capable of performing their functions, including delivering basic social services, an acute humanitarian crisis, and economic collapse, all factors which have taken a heavy toll on the population. This situation has seriously undermined the relative peace that existed in other parts of the country, notably in the Sool region, and brought further instability to a region already faced with huge security challenges.

51. While the convening of the NRC in Mogadishu in July and August 2007 represented a landmark in the effort to promote an all-inclusive political process, the Congress is yet to yield the much-expected results in terms of bringing together the various Somali stakeholders onto the path of durable peace. Although, some steps were taken by the TFG to guarantee the credibility of the process, crucial stakeholders boycotted the Congress, with some resorting to violence and, in some instances, outright acts of terrorism, to achieve their political objectives and undermine all attempts at achieving a peaceful solution. Divisions and lack of harmony within the TFIs, particularly the TFG, with the rift between the President and the former Prime Minister,

coupled with the weak human resource, financial and managerial capacity of the Somali institutions and other factors, aggravated the situation. As a result, there was no an immediate and effective follow-up to the recommendations of the NRC.

52. Twelve months after the initial decision authorizing the deployment of AMISOM, less than a quarter of the mandated strength is on the ground. In spite of the numerous appeals made by the AU, echoed by the UN Security Council in several resolutions and presidential statements, the financial and logistical support mobilized so far, which comes mainly from the AU partners, is far short of what is required to fully deploy the Mission, provide it with the required equipment and sustain its operations on the ground. In addition, to date, the pledges made by Member States to contribute troops for AMISOM represent only a little over half of the authorized strength. This state of affairs, not only deprives AMISOM of the much needed reinforcement and of critical components, notably the maritime one, but also make it more difficult for the Commission to engage the international community effectively for it to be more forthcoming in its support and live up to its responsibilities towards Somalia and its people.

53. Another contributing factor to the limited results achieved so far is the lack of cohesion and unity of purpose within the region. As experience has time and again demonstrated, regional cohesion is a key ingredient in any attempt to bring about lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia. Unless the TFG, which is the result of a regionally and internationally sponsored process, operates in a more conducive regional environment it would face huge challenges in fulfilling its responsibilities.

54. Finally, the support received from the larger international community remains inadequate. Much more is needed to build and enhance the capacity of the TFIs for them to effectively play the role expected of them; similar efforts are required to facilitate the full deployment of AMISOM and the implementation of its mandate; urgent action is needed to ensure the deployment of a United Nations operation that would take over from AMISOM and support the long-term reconstruction and stabilization of Somalia.

55. When, towards the end of 2006, the TFG returned to Mogadishu and regained control of large parts of the country, the international community as a whole agreed that this represented an unprecedented opportunity to restore structures of governance in the country, as well as to bring to a definite end the violence that Somalia witnessed for more than a decade and the untold suffering inflicted on its people. However, as stressed by Council in its press statement of 20 December 2007, it is today clear that both the Somali actors and the international community as a whole, have failed to take advantage of this window of opportunity and to mobilize the political will required to bring about lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

56. While valuable time has been lost, turning around the situation and achieving lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia remains within reach. However, this would require determined action by both the Somalis and the international community. In this respect, the following needs to be highlighted:

- (i) First and foremost, the TFG should urgently devise concrete ways to fully implement the outcome of the NRC, and adopt a broader inclusive approach that will appeal to all Somali stakeholders who reject violence, both within and outside Somalia, in line within the TFC. The AU is ready to assist in this respect, working closely with all relevant international actors.

The composition of the new cabinet and the repeated assurances given by the Prime Minister about reconciliation are encouraging signs; they need to be followed through and sustained. At the same time, the TFIs should strengthen their cohesion and unity of purpose.

- (ii) The international community, including AU Member States, should take the necessary steps to enhance the capacity of the TFIs to enable them fully assume their responsibilities, for all efforts to consolidate peace, promote reconciliation and facilitate reconstruction would fail if not sustained by the establishment of effective governance structures, including in the area of security, administration and justice, as well as the extension of TFG authority.

In the coming weeks, the Commission intends to consult with ECA and ADB, as well as with other relevant African institutions, with the view of dispatching, as early as possible, an assessment team that would identify the most critical needs of the TFG and make recommendations on how best to mobilize support both within and outside the continent.

- (iii) The deployment of AMISOM needs to be accelerated in order to effectively assist in the stabilization of the country and help create the necessary political space for all Somalis to contribute positively to the reconciliation process.

This requires that Member States respond positively and swiftly to the repeated appeals made to them over the past months to provide the troops and other personnel needed to reach AMISOM authorized strength. The Commission will devise ways of more effective engagement with Member States, including through sensitization missions to potential TCCs, and better explain how they could, within their respective capabilities, contribute to the requirements of the Mission.

The full deployment of AMISOM also requires that increased resources and logistical support be mobilized. Clearly, our partners have a key role to play in this regard, especially as the AU, in deploying in Somalia, is also acting on behalf of the larger international community. Renewed efforts should be made to this end.

At the same time, AU Member States should also make financial and logistical contributions towards the full deployment of AMISOM and the sustenance of its operations. It is a matter of deep concern to the Commission to note that very few Member States have, so far, provided support, even if symbolic, to the Mission. In this respect, and in view of the

fact that no peace support operation can be efficiently managed based only on voluntary and, therefore, unpredictable contributions, Council may wish to look, once again, at this issue with a view to finding more appropriate solutions.

Furthermore, there is urgent need to enhance the management of AMISOM and ensure greater responsiveness of the relevant structures of the Commission to its needs, particularly as far as recruitment and procurement are concerned, as well as closer coordination among all Departments concerned.

In the meantime, I recommend that Council extend the mandate of AMISOM for another period of six months.

- (iv) More efforts are required to build consensus in the region in support of the ongoing process in Somalia. For all its shortcomings, the TFG is yet the best chance in years for moving forward peace and reconciliation in Somalia. The AU, working with its partners, in particular the United Nations, has a role to play in this respect.

More generally, the crisis in Somalia and its regional implications point to the need for a regional and coherent approach, if lasting peace and stability is to be achieved. The Commission will consult with relevant regional and international players to further reflect on the issue and on how best the support of the international community could be enlisted for such an undertaking.

- (v) The UN arms embargo imposed by resolution 733 (1992) needs, on basis of clear benchmarks, to be reviewed in such a way as to enable the TFG, which is internationally recognized, to build up and equip its security forces, which should be all-inclusive, while at the same time maintaining and strengthening its provisions against elements whose actions are bent on undermining peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

More generally, the United Nations Security Council should take measures against ‘those who seek to prevent or block the NRC or a peaceful political process, or those who threaten the TFIs or AMISOM by force, or take action that undermines stability in Somalia or the region’, in line with its intention as stated in resolution 1772(2007).

- (vi) The AU and the larger international community need to widen their perspectives and look more closely at developments taking place in other parts of Somalia. Concretely, urgent and concerted action should be taken to contain the conflict between Puntland and Somaliland, which, if allowed to continue, will spread violence and destabilize in areas that were previously peaceful, with far-reaching humanitarian and regional implications.

- (vii) While efforts are underway on the political and security aspects, humanitarian assistance to affected populations in Somalia should be stepped up. In this respect, building trust between the TFG and the humanitarian community, facilitating access to needy populations and improving security are key. The AU, in spite of its limitations, has a role to play both in terms of advocacy and mobilizing assistance from the continent and the larger international community.
- (viii) As Council has repeatedly emphasized, the long-term stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia requires resources and expertise that are far beyond the current capacities of the AU. Hence, the need for the United Nations Security Council, in line with its primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security, to urgently authorize the deployment of a UN operation that would take over from AMISOM. Council may wish to renew its call to the United Nations to that effect, while more sustained efforts should be made to mobilize the support needed within the international community.

57. It is my earnest hope that the present meeting of Council will undertake a thorough and objective assessment of the situation in Somalia and the efforts made so far, with a view to agreeing on a focused and determined course of action on the basis of which the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, at its forthcoming session at the end of this month, could generate further political will and resolve to act. Somalia is a test case of our determination to rid our continent of the scourge of conflicts and give concrete meaning to our stated commitment to assist the Somali people. It is also a test of the commitment of the United Nations to fully assume its primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security.

58. More than ever before, swift and collective action is needed not only because of the unfolding humanitarian crisis and the suffering inflicted on the Somali people, but also in view of the security implications of the current situation. Failure to effectively address the crisis in Somalia will leave a legacy of unfulfilled promises towards the Somali people, damage the credibility of the international community, as well as further undermine the prospects of peace in the country and compound efforts to promote regional stability.

AFRICAN UNION
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PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
105th MEETING
18 JANUARY 2008
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

PSC/PR/COMM (CV)

COMMUNIQUE

**COMMUNIQUE OF THE 105TH MEETING OF THE
PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL**

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 105th meeting held on 18 January 2008, adopted the following decision on the situation in Somalia:

Council:

1. **TAKES NOTE** of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia [PSC/PR/2(CV)];
2. **RECALLS** all its previous decisions and press statements on the situation in Somalia;
3. **REITERATES** its attachment to the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia;
4. **WELCOMES** the convening of the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) as a significant step towards an all-inclusive and genuine reconciliation process, within the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC). Council **FURTHER WELCOMES** the appointment of a new Somali Prime Minister, Mr. Nur Hassan Hussein, and the subsequent formation of a new Cabinet, as well as the assurances given by the Prime Minister regarding his commitment to an all-inclusive and genuine reconciliation;
5. **EXPRESSES APPRECIATION** for the work accomplished thus far by the Ugandan contingent of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), in spite of the very limited personnel deployed so far, the numerous logistical constraints facing the Mission and the challenging conditions in which it is working. Council **FURTHER EXPRESSES** appreciation to the Ugandan Government for its continued commitment to the promotion of lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia, and to the Government of Burundi for providing troops to AMISOM;
6. **WELCOMES** the support, both financial and logistical, provided so far by AU partners and member States, which made the current AMISOM deployment possible;
7. **STRONGLY CONDEMNS**, once again, the threats and/or acts of violence and terrorism perpetrated by those elements seeking to undermine the political process, hinder the operations of AMISOM and undermine regional peace and stability;
8. **FURTHER CONDEMNS** all acts of violence perpetrated against humanitarian workers, as well as attacks against civilians, in violation of international humanitarian law. Council **PAYS TRIBUTE** to all humanitarian agencies and workers involved in relief work in Somalia under very difficult circumstances and **EXPRESSES GRATITUDE** to the countries providing support for

humanitarian activities in Somalia, including measures taken to combat piracy off the Somali coast and escort ships carrying World Food Programme (WFP) humanitarian aid to Somalia;

9. **EXPRESSES CONCERN** at the repeated clashes and continued tension in the Sool and Sanaag regions, in north central Somalia, and its consequences on the ongoing efforts to promote lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia;
10. **FURTHER EXPRESSES** concern at the persistence of the phenomenon of piracy off the coast of Somalia and its serious implications for security and delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia and **CALLS ON** all countries in a position to do so to take appropriate steps to prevent and combat acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia, in line with the relevant provisions of UN Security Council resolution 1772(2007) of 20 August 2007;
11. **EXPRESSES DEEP CONCERN** that, in spite of all the efforts deployed, progress towards the restoration of lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia remains extremely limited, as manifested by, among others, the persistent violence and its attendant consequences on the political environment and the humanitarian situation, the short-comings of the ongoing reconciliation process in terms of inclusiveness, as well as the delays encountered in the deployment of AMISOM, as a result of insufficient troop pledges by member States and inadequate financial and logistical support, and the lack of progress in the efforts towards the deployment of a United Nations operation that would take over AMISOM and support the long-term stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia;
12. **AFFIRMS** its conviction that, despite the daunting challenges confronting the peace and reconciliation process, the opportunity that arose in December 2006, when the TFG regained control of Mogadishu and other parts of the country, still exists and should be seized by the Somali stakeholders and the international community as a whole to decisively address the conflict in Somalia. Council **URGES** all stakeholders, both within and outside Somalia, to take all steps required to this end. Council, accordingly:

On the reconciliation process:

- (i) **EMPHASIZES** the need for the TFG to urgently devise concrete ways to fully implement the outcome of the NRC, and adopt a broader inclusive approach to reach out to all Somali stakeholders who reject violence, both within and outside Somalia, in line with the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC);
- (ii) **DEMANDS** that all parties in Somalia reject violence, uphold the principles and spirit enshrined in the TFC and commit themselves to seek peaceful solutions and work towards genuine national reconciliation within that framework;

- (iii) **STRESSES** the need for the international community, in general, and the countries of the region, in particular, to fully back the ongoing reconciliation process in Somalia. Council **FURTHER STRESSES** the need to avoid a proliferation of initiatives and for all efforts by the international community to be concerted and coordinated with those of the AU and geared towards consolidating the TFIs and the initiatives of the TFG in pursuit of the reconciliation process in Somalia;
- (iv) **REQUESTS** the Chairperson of the Commission, working closely with all stakeholders, including the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States, the United Nations and other AU partners, to continue and intensify his efforts in support of the reconciliation process in Somalia, including the early convening of the High-Level International Meeting planned by the Commission to refocus international attention on Somalia and mobilize the requisite support for the ongoing process in that country;

On the enhancement of the capacity of the TFIs:

- (v) **CALLS ON** all member States and the larger international community to provide adequate support in order to enhance the capacity of the Somali institutions, including the TFG and its security and defence forces, to enable them fully play their role;
- (vi) **ENCOURAGES** the Commission to speed up its planned consultations with the ECA and the ADB and other relevant African institutions, with a view to dispatching a needs assessment team to Somalia as soon as possible;

On the tension in the Sool and Sanaag regions of Somalia:

- (vii) **URGES** all parties concerned to take urgent steps to address the tension in the Sool and Sanaag regions of Somalia, which, if allowed to continue, will spread violence and destabilize areas that were previously peaceful, with far-reaching implications;

II. ON THE COHESION WITHIN THE REGION:

- (viii) **STRESSES** the need to enhance cohesion among countries of the region and create a more conducive environment for addressing the multifaceted security challenges in Somalia;
- (ix) **REQUESTS** the Chairperson of the Commission, working closely with IGAD and other stakeholders, to support efforts aimed at enhancing regional cohesion;

III. ON THE ACTION AGAINST SPOILERS AND THE UN ARMS EMBARGO:

- (x) **CALLS ON** all Member States and partners to stand firm on the side of Somalia's legitimate institutions in their efforts to fight violence and other acts aimed at undermining the political process;
- (xi) **URGES** the United Nations Security Council to review the arms embargo imposed by resolution 733 (1992) in order to enable the TFG to establish effective and all-inclusive security and defense forces, while at the same time maintaining and strengthening the embargo against elements who are bent on undermining peace and reconciliation in Somalia;
- (xii) **FURTHER URGES** the United Nations Security Council to "take measures against those who seek to prevent or block the NRC or a peaceful political process, or those who threaten the TFIs or AMISOM by force, or take action that undermines stability in Somalia or the region", in line with its intention as stated in resolution 1772(2007);

IV. ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

- (xiii) **APPEALS** to the international community, including member States, to continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the needy population in Somalia and to contribute financial assistance to cover the outstanding requirements of the Somalia Consolidated Appeal for 2008;
- (xiv) **URGES** that all necessary steps be taken to create conditions conducive for the provision of humanitarian assistance, including unhindered access to needy population and security for humanitarian workers and organizations. In this respect, Council **WELCOMES** the discussions between the humanitarian community and the Somali authorities in order to overcome the current difficulties and create the required climate of trust and cooperation;
- (xv) **ENCOURAGES** Member States that are in a position to do so to contribute to the escort and protection of ships delivering WFP humanitarian assistance to Somalia, in line with resolution 1772(2007) adopted by the Security Council on 20 August 2007;

V. ON AMISOM:

- (xvi) **DECIDES** to extend the mandate of AMISOM for six months, with effect from the date of this decision, to carry out the same tasks and responsibilities as stipulated under the current mandate of AMISOM;
- (xvii) **APPEALS**, once again, to member States to provide the required troops and personnel to reach the authorized strength of AMISOM, as well as

financial and logistical support, to facilitate the deployment of the Mission and the sustenance of its operations;

- (xviii) **FURTHER APPEALS** to the AU partners to provide increased logistical and financial support for AMISOM, especially in view of the fact that the AU, in deploying an operation in Somalia, is also acting on behalf of the larger international community;

On the deployment of a United Nations operation:

- (xix) **STRESSES**, once again, the need for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia that will take over AMISOM and support the long-term stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia;

- (xx) **REITERATES ITS APPEAL** to the Security Council to urgently take steps for the early deployment of such an operation, bearing in mind that it has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In the meantime, Council **URGES** that all steps required be taken for the UN to provide AMISOM with a support package, within the framework of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter;

- (xxi) **REQUESTS** the African Group in New York and the African members of the Security Council to spare no efforts to ensure that Somalia features highly on the agenda of the Security Council and that the decisions expected of this organ are urgently taken;

13. **REQUESTS** the Chairperson of the Commission to follow up on the implementation of this decision and to report to it regularly on the steps taken to this effect;

14. **DECIDES** to remain seized of the matter.

ASSEMBLY/AU/3 (X)
ANNEX III

DECLARATION

AFRICAN UNION

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**BRAINSTORMING RETREAT BETWEEN
THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE REGIONAL
MECHANISMS FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION,
MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION
5 – 6 JANUARY 2008
ALGIERS, ALGERIA**

AU-RECs/RMs.Decl

DECLARATION

DECLARATION

We,

- the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the Commission of the African Union (AU),
- the President of the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
- the Secretaries General/Executive Secretaries of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD),
- other representatives of the East African Community (EAC), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA),
- the Director of the Coordinating Mechanism of the Regional Standby Brigade of East Africa (EASBRICOM) and the representative of the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC),

met in Algiers on 5 and 6 January 2008, within the framework of a Brainstorming Retreat, to consider the state of our cooperation and agree on ways and means of strengthening and deepening our partnership in order to promote peace, security and stability in our continent, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol.

This Retreat was also attended by the representatives of Cameroon, Chair of the PSC for the month of January 2008, and of Ghana, Current Chair of the AU. The opening session was graced by the presence of the Algerian Minister for Maghreb and African Affairs.

On the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture

Our Retreat afforded us an opportunity to take stock of the progress made in the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture, as spelt out in the AU PSC Protocol.

In this regard, we noted with satisfaction the remarkable progress made in the establishment of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), both at the level of the AU and the Regional Mechanisms, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol and the roadmap adopted by the Meeting of Government Experts on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention, held in Kempton Park, South Africa, in December 2006. The operationalization of the CEWS is all the more important in view of the fact that conflict prevention is at the core of the mandates of our respective organizations.

We also welcome the progress made towards the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF), in application of the relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol and the Framework Document on the Establishment of the ASF. Although they are at different stages in their efforts, all the regions of the continent have taken the necessary measures for the establishment of the regional standby brigades provided for within the framework of the ASF. In addition, the basic documents relating to the different aspects of the ASF have been elaborated during workshops jointly organized by the AU and the regions. We underscore the urgent need for the holding of the proposed meeting of African Ministers of Defence and Security, which should validate these documents and adopt the roadmap for the second phase of the establishment of the ASF with a view to its operationalization by 2010, including the development of a rapid deployment capability, which should be taken into consideration in the different ASF scenarios.

At the same time, we recognize that there is still a lot to be done to render the African Peace and Security Architecture fully operational, particularly the CEWS and the ASF, including:

- the strengthening of coordination and harmonization between the continental and the regional levels, in order for all ongoing and future efforts to be fully in line with the arrangements agreed on in this respect;
- the rationalization, as much as possible, of the ongoing efforts, in particular by finding appropriate solutions to the problems linked to the fact that some Member States belong to more than one Regional Mechanism, the objective being to avoid duplication and make optimal use of available resources;
- the intensification, with the support of the AU and other regions, of efforts aimed at accelerating progress in all the Mechanisms concerned;
- the strengthening of the role of the AU, which should fully assume its responsibilities in steering, coordinating and harmonizing efforts aimed at establishing the African Peace and Security Architecture; and
- the provision by African States of the human, financial and institutional means required for the establishment and operationalization of the different components of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

Status of Peace and Security in Africa

Our Retreat reviewed the state of peace and security in the different regions of the continent. We welcome the significant progress made in many countries and regions as a result of the collective, resolute, action of the AU and the Regional Mechanisms, with the support of our partners in the international community. This progress should be consolidated through the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and development programmes on the basis of the Policy Framework adopted in this respect by the AU Executive Council in Banjul, in June 2006. We undertake to double and better coordinate our efforts to ensure more effective monitoring of this Policy

Framework and the implementation of the directives contained therein, including dispatching joint assessment missions to evaluate the needs of countries emerging from conflicts and the implementation of coordinated activities to support post-conflict reconstruction, including rapid recovery of the countries concerned, advocacy for debt cancellation, reform of the security sector and the consolidation of state institutions.

Despite this progress, our continent unfortunately continues to face the scourge of conflicts and instability. In many regions, violence is still prevalent, affecting primarily civilian populations and undermining efforts towards socio-economic development and the promotion of the rule of law and good governance.

We are determined to intensify and better coordinate our efforts towards contributing to the rapid resolution of existing conflicts and strengthening our action in the area of prevention. In this respect, we stress the need to fully apply the principle of non-indifference enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act and the relevant instruments of Regional Mechanisms. It is incumbent upon Member States, in conformity with the PSC Protocol and relevant regional instruments, to lend their full and unconditional support to conflict prevention and resolution efforts undertaken at continental and regional levels. More specifically, member States should, in conformity with the commitments they have made, provide the AU and the Regional Mechanisms with the necessary political and other support, including facilitating the effective exercise by these organizations of their responsibilities regarding the promotion of peace and security.

Similarly, we reaffirm the determination of our respective organizations to spare no effort to tackle terrorism, in conformity with the relevant AU instruments. We commend the action of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism and intend to take full advantage of the opportunities it provides.

We are deeply concerned by the magnitude of drug trafficking and organized transnational crime, as well as by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, which contribute to the weakening of the State structures and perpetuation of insecurity.

Electoral Tensions and Disputes

Our Retreat noted, with concern, the emergence of new challenges linked to the tension which frequently characterizes electoral processes in Africa. This situation has not only the potential of endangering stability, but also that of undermining the democratic processes initiated in the continent in accordance with relevant OAU/AU instruments.

Accordingly, we acknowledge that there is an urgent need to initiate a collective reflection on these developments in order to agree on a common strategy aimed at avoiding election-related disputes and violence, and preventing the election period in Africa from becoming synonymous with tension. There is a need, *inter alia*, to:

- improve monitoring of political developments in the countries concerned during the pre-election phase, including through early warning systems;

- strengthen election observation by deploying missions with adequate strength ahead of the election, with a view to having a more comprehensive view of the situation and making, if need be, recommendations to the stakeholders to guarantee the transparency of the electoral process;
- effectively combine the resources of the AU and the competent regional organizations, including the deployment of joint evaluation and electoral observation missions;
- undertake, whenever required, preventive deployments of peace support operations; and
- ensure that Africa, through the missions deployed on the ground, is in a position to speak with one voice, with the necessary authority and objectivity, on the transparency of electoral processes and ensure that these processes are fully owned by Africa.

In order to delve further into this issue and submit recommendations to the competent AU organs, we agreed to organize, as soon as possible, a seminar on electoral related conflicts and the challenges they pose for peace and security in Africa. We have requested the AU Commission, in collaboration with COMESA and SADC Secretariats, to prepare a concept note to this effect.

Financing Peace and Security Efforts in Africa

In considering the constraints to our efforts, we noted that financing constitutes one of the greatest difficulties facing the AU and the Regional Mechanisms. Our organizations are almost exclusively dependent on the resources provided by our partners. Clearly, this is a deplorable situation: as much as it is important to mobilize the support of the international community towards the peace efforts made in the continent, it is equally crucial for Africa to endow itself with the means to successfully implement the ambitious agenda it has set for herself.

We reiterate our gratitude to our partners and urge them to continue to provide their assistance, and express our full support for the efforts invested by the AU towards the financing, through United Nations assessed contributions, of peace support operations undertaken by the AU or under its authority, with the consent of the Security Council, as well as the establishment of a facility that would complement the Africa Peace Facility established by the European Union (EU) at the request of the AU.

At the same time, we underscore the imperative need for African States to contribute more significantly to the financing of the activities undertaken by the AU and the Regional Mechanisms in the area of peace and security, through a system of assessed contributions or alternative sources of financing. In doing so, the objective is for Africa to further demonstrate its political will to rid the continent of the scourge of conflicts, effectively take ownership of efforts deployed in this respect, and ensure their sustainability.

Coordination of interaction with international partners

We recognize the need for better coordination between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms with regard to relations with the international partners, to ensure greater consistency, facilitate the achievement of our set objectives within the framework of the continental peace and security agenda, and maximize the impact of international assistance. In this regard, we commit to:

- agree on common modalities for interaction with partners;
- coordinate our actions in the relevant international organs, in order to effectively defend African interests and positions, as defined at continental level; and
- keep each other mutually informed of developments relating to our respective relations with our partners.

Adoption of the Draft Memorandum of Understanding

Having considered the draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in the area of Peace and Security between the AU, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms submitted by the meeting of experts held in Kampala, Uganda, from 31 August to 2 September 2007, we have agreed to sign this text, as reviewed and amended during our Retreat, on the margins of the forthcoming AU meetings in Addis Ababa at the end of January 2008. The signing of this MoU, elaborated in conformity with Article 16 of the PSC Protocol, will mark an important step in the implementation process of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

Final Remarks

We have agreed to submit this Declaration, for consideration, to the next AU Assembly.

We express our sincere thanks to the Government of Algeria for the facilities provided in order to ensure the success of this Retreat.