PSC/PR/2 (CV) Rev.1 Page 11 December 2007. The main objectives of the workshops were to identify areas of synergy and collaboration between AMISOM and other actors in Somalia, to support AMISOM planning capability, and to articulate coordinated responses to the current needs of Somalia through exchange of information. A number of recommendations were made, including the establishment of a working group bringing together all stakeholders, the review of AMISOM mandate to highlight protection and human rights issues, the institutionalization of joint AMISOM/UN visits to Somalia, and a strengthened political presence in Mogadishu to support more effectively the reconciliation process. A final meeting is expected to take place in the coming weeks to consolidate the recommendations made and pave the way for their implementation. 41. As indicated above, on 18 July 2007, Council extended the mandate of AMISOM for a further period of 6 months, a decision welcomed by the United Nations Security Council in its resolution 1772 (2007) of 20 August 2007. In that decision, Council reiterated its urgent call to the AU Member States and partners to provide the necessary financial, logistical and technical support to make it possible for AMISOM to rapidly attain its authorized strength and continue its operations. It also called on all Member States to contribute troops and other personnel required for AMISOM. Council stressed, once again, the need for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia that will take over from AMISOM and support the long-term stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia. Pending such a deployment, Council called on the United Nations to put in place a financial, logistical and technical support package for AMISOM, within the context of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. 42. As a follow-up to this decision, I wrote, on 4 August 2007, to the United Nations Secretary-General, echoing the call by Council for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia and the provision, in the meantime, of support to AMISOM. While concurring with the position expressed by the Secretary-General in his 25 June 2007 report on the situation in Somalia that a UN operation would only succeed if deployed in support of a political process and not as a substitution for one, I expressed the hope that the United Nations would look at the situation in Somalia with the required flexibility, bearing in mind that the political and peacekeeping aspects are closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing. In this respect, I referred to the NRC, which was then ongoing, and to the duty of the international community to encourage the Somalis and provide further support in order to enhance the prospects of lasting peace and reconciliation. I stressed that failure by the international community to act swiftly in support of the ongoing process could undermine the modest progress already achieved in Somalia, with far-reaching regional implications and further suffering for the Somali people. 43. In response, the UN Secretary-General wrote to me on 24 September 2007. In his letter, he indicated that, in his view, the most immediate priority for the international community at this stage is to assist in bringing together all Somali groups under a credible and genuine peace process. He stated that it was crucial to ensure that the conditions set out in his 25 June report are in place before the possible deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation, adding that, in the view of the United Nations, the NRC had