PSC/AHG/2(CCL) Annex 4 Page 8 Agreement with Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ), on 15 March 2010, in Addis Ababa, the political process continues to be challenged by recurrent and intermittent wrangling within the TFIs. This state of affairs has eroded the cohesion within the TFIs and seriously undermined their ability to effectively implement their obligations under the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) and the Djibouti peace process. It is against this background that, on 21 September 2010, Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke decided to resign from his position. He has, since, been replaced by Mohammed Abudllah Mohamed “Farmajo” who formed a new cabinet on 12 November 2010. The TFP is yet to endorse this cabinet. Against this background, it is imperative that the TFIs demonstrate the leadership and the unity of purpose required to meet the challenges at hand. 24. In line with the Tripoli Declaration and Plan of Action, the Commission has intensified its efforts towards the full deployment of AMISOM. I am pleased to report that the troop strength of AMISOM has increased to 8,000, comprising a total of 9 battalions: 4 from Burundi and 5 from Uganda. The strength of the police component of AMISOM is now 50. On the ground, AMISOM forces have consolidated and expanded their areas of control in Mogadishu, while providing limited humanitarian support to the civilian population. Furthermore, AMISOM and other members of the international community, in support of priorities identified by the TFG, continue to assist in the rebuilding of the Somali Security Forces. 25. In the Tripoli Plan of Action, the Assembly requested Council to review the mandate and strength of AMISOM, to enable it to provide increased assistance to the TFG. On 15 October 2010, and as a follow-up to the IGAD and AU Summits decisions of July 2010, Council endorsed a new force strength of 20,000 for AMISOM, as well as an enhanced police and civilian component, as proposed in my report. The objective is to better support the peace and reconciliation process, including the achievement of the remaining transitional tasks, improve the security situation, to enable the TFIs discharge their responsibilities, assist in the establishment of effective governmental institutions, and facilitate peace building, recovery and humanitarian efforts. 26. Council called on the Security Council to take the decisions now required of it, in line with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, by endorsing the revised concept of operations and the newly-authorized strength of AMISOM and authorizing an enhanced support package for the Mission, funded through UN assessed contributions. Council further called on the Security Council to impose a naval blockade and a no-fly zone over Somalia to prevent the entry of foreign elements into the country, as well as flights and shipments carrying weapons and ammunitions to armed groups inside Somalia; ensure the effective implementation of sanctions against all those impeding the peace and reconciliation process; and reaffirm its commitment to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia. At the time of finalizing this report, the UN Security Council was yet to respond to the request made by the AU. Needless to stress that time is not on our side, and that any further delay in the provision, by the United Nations, of the support required for the strengthening of AMISOM will further complicate the situation and undermine the prospects for peace