Assembly/AU/ 7 (X)I Page 7 market-based arrangements. Such subsidized programs should be focused on and limited to least-developed countries. The timing of these actions is crucial for achieving a rapid production stimulus for smallholder agriculture and the small business sector serving agriculture. Banking and finance are also critical for success. These short-term programs should have clearly defined and communicated exit strategies. Even though the production response should be quick, it needs to be driven largely by higher yields rather than area expansion. Fast-impact production programs would jump-start agricultural growth in the short-term, create income-earning opportunities in the crisis and lower prices. 4. Change biofuel policies. A range of measures should be considered to make more grains and oilseeds currently used for fuel available for food and feed. These measures include freezing biofuel production at current levels, reducing it, or imposing a moratorium for biofuels based on grains and oilseeds (that is, temporarily suspending the use of grains and oilseeds for biofuel production) until prices come down to reasonable levels according to long-run supply and demand. At the same time, more support should go toward developing bioenergy technologies that do not compete with food. A grain-based biofuels moratorium would quickly unlock grains and oilseeds for food. This measure might bring maize prices down by about 20 percent and, as a consequence, decrease wheat prices by about 10 percent. (b) Medium to Long-term Investment Actions 5. Calm markets with market-oriented regulation of speculation, shared public grain stocks, strengthened food import financing, and reliable food aid. Speculation is mainly a consequence, not a cause, of the price crisis, so overregulation and market policing would be inappropriate responses. Surveillance and regulatory measures, however, such as monitoring speculative capital or limiting futures trading, should be taken to curb excessive speculation in agricultural commodity markets. Under the current tight market conditions, it is infeasible to accumulate a global stock of grain that would bring the desired calming effect into the markets. Agreements on joint pooling of fixed portions of national stocks at the regional or global level would seem feasible, however. A coordinated set of pledges for a modest grain reserve to be made by the main grain-producing countries (including coordinated releases from the reserve for regional emergencies when prices increase excessively over what market fundamentals indicate) should be established at global or regional levels. A global intelligence network should inform the management of these international coordinated reserves. The pooling of global or regional public stocks, complemented by an import-financing facility, would allow countries with greater food deficits in a particular region to gain access to food supplies at reasonable and stable prices in times of crisis. It would also help contain the speculative expectations that fuel further price rises during the upswing. But such reserves have costs, depending upon their size, which need to be carefully weighed against potential benefits.